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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the beginning of commercial air travel,
the airlines have been among the most regulated of
industries. Aside from extensively regulating aviation
safety, technical standards and operational procedures,
nations have also traditionally controlled the commercial
aspects of the airline business. Most nations have done
this by restricting their airline markets to one state
owned airline.
The United states is one of the few nations where
private ownership and more than one carrier has been
permitted since the inception of the industry. However,
even then, for over forty years the federal government had
strictly controlled the routes, rates and capacity of the
airlines. It also severely restricted entry and exit from
the market and prohibited acquisitions and mergers of
airlines without its prior approval. In addition, domestic
routes were reserved for "national" carriers and a clear
distinction was maintained between carriers permitted to
fly on international flights and those permitted to fly on
1
2domestic routes. Finally, foreign competitors were
excluded from the domestic market.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 19781 and its
international counterpart, The International Air
Transportation competition Act of 19792, marked an
important departure from this traditional approach to the
airline regulation. Almost overnight, it did away with a
complex regulatory structure that had existed for over
four decades, and left the industry to the indulgence of
an untested market. Not only was this type of abrupt
reversal of regulatory policy rare in a democracy,S it
was also the first attempt by any nation to permit
airlines to run as normal commercial enterprises and make
their own economic decisions. As such, it marked the
beginning of a unique experiment. This thesis will review
the performance of the deregulated airline industry in
order to assess the claim that this experiment has failed
and the industry needs to be reregulated.
1 Pub. L. No 95-504, 92 stat. 1705 (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
2 Pub. L. No 96-192, 94 stat. 35 (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.c.).
8 Historical experience as well as political reform
theory suggests that proposals to alter regulatory
controls by extinguishing the authority of the regulator
produce substantial political opposition. See ANTHONY E.
BROWN, THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION, 4 (1987); For a
review of political theory relating to economic
deregulation see DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS, Ch.
1 (1981)
31.1 Clarification of Key Terms
As the expressions "regulation", "deregulation" and
"reregulation" will be used quite frequently in the
following discussions, it is necessary to clarify at the
outset what these expressions mean. Deregulation,
intuitively, suggests freedom from regulation. In fact the
dictionary meaning is just that.4 More technically,
regulation has been defined as "a process consisting of
the intentional restriction of a subject's choice of
activity by an entity not directly party to or involved in
that activity.,,5 Deregulation can be defined as "the
removal of such a choice restriction.,,6
This definition, however, does not bring out clearly
the manner in which the expression is used in public
policy discussions and literature relating to the
deregulation of airlines.7 Deregulation does not mean the
complete removal of all government restrictions on private
choice so as to leave the industry concerned in a state
4 For instance, the Webster's New World Dictionary
defines "deregulation" as "to remove regulations
governing" and further qualifies it as an expression of
American origin, which it indeed is. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, 371 (Third College Edition,
1988) •
5 BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:
CREATING, DESIGNING AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS, 9 (1980).
This "entity" could be both a government or a private
body. We are concerned with regulation by the government.
6 Id.,at418.
7 Or, for that matter, any other industry.
4where no regulation exists. Broadly construed, regulation
consists of all controls that define rights, impose duties
and articulate the nature and scope of public intervention
into the decision making of economic actors. As such, a
truly regulation-less state would be impossible to attain.
The expression deregulation, rather, signifies the
removal of some specific set of regulatory controls
peculiar to the industry or activity being deregulated,
which leaves the concerned economic entities8 with
greater discretion in the matter of economic decision
k' 9ma l.ng.
To understand the process by which an industry is
deregulated, it is helpful to distinguish between
"restricting choice" through regulatory control and
"influencing choice" through other forms of government
intervention.
In the first case, the actual conduct of the
commercial enterprise is controlled. Private management is
required to take administrative clearance before taking
8 i.e., producers and consumers.
9 Deregulation may also be defined in other ways. ~
qenerallv MITNICK, supra note 5. Mitnick notes that the
expression has been used with respect to 1) the stated
purpose or intended consequences of deregulation, 2) the
type of activity which is to be deregulated, and 3) the
regulatory instruments or authority which is removed as a
result of deregulation; the expression is also sometimes
used in situations of "de facto" regulation, where
conditions approximating deregulation are attained through
lax enforcement of regulations, and not by any formal
reduction of regulatory authority of a government agency.
5certain actions, and the regulatory agency uses broad
discretionary powers to supervise the industry.10 Such
regulation emphasizes the prevention of potential
11problems and are commonly characterized as "classical",
"administrative", "direct", positive", "hands-on",
"public-utility type", or "command-and-control"
1 t· 12regu a ~on.
"Influencing choice" through regulation, on the other
hand, is achieved through less intrusive forms of
intervention like antitrust enforcement, information
disclosure rules, taxes and subsidies, market based
incentives, and liability rules enforceable through
private litigation. Such regulations aim to influence
conduct by providing a mix of rewards and punishments
which are designed to induce a certain kind of desirable
conduct. The underlying assumption here is that once the
consequences of certain actions are known the course of
action which maximizes the awards and minimizes the
punishment will be chosen. However, it is private
management and not the government which decides what this
course of action will be.
These two forms of regulation are by no means
mutually exclusive. In the real world various combinations
10 BROWN, supra note 3, at 25.
11 Id., at 24.
12 Id.
6of regulatory instruments may be used to ensure that
private conduct conforms to public standards.
Deregulation, therefore, can be said to occur when there
is a shift from a combination of regulatory controls
emphasizing on classical command- and-control type of
regulation, to one which relies primarily on indirect,
1 't 'f ft' t t' ~ess 1n rUS1ve orms 0 governmen 1n erven 10n.
Reregulation is an expression used to signify a
return to a former system of direct regulation after a
period of deregulation. Though the expression may suggest
otherwise, reregulation is not the only alternative to
deregulation. A different combination of non-intrusive
forms of regulatory controls can be substituted for the
same.
Deregulation in the context of the American airline
industry meant a change from a system of direct regulation
of routes, rates, entry and exit, by the civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), to one of antitrust scrutiny and safety
monitoring which left the economic decisions to the
discretion of the airlines. Reregulation, in this context,
means a return to a CAB type regulatory regime.
13 This shift has to be significant. Mere incremental
change in the structure of regulatory control resulting in
marginal increase in private discretion would not be
deregulation though it may be labelled as
"liberalization". The difference is one of degree and not
amenable to precise definition.
71.2 Issues Raised by Airline Deregulation
The u.s. deregulation experience has been the focus
of considerable academic study and debate. The
proliferation of literature following the dramatic change
of regulatory structure has prompted one commentator to
remark that "the study of airline deregulation has become
almost a cottage industry. ,,14 Indeed economists, lawyers,
industry insiders and academicians who had earlier debated
about the desirability of deregulating the industry have
continued to study it to see whether the outcome of the
. t t d th I . d' t' 15exper~men suppor e e ear ~er pre ~c ~ons.
The results of deregulation, however, have not
conformed to all of the theoretical projections based on
14 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in
Derequlated Markets: Theory. Firm strategy. and Public
POlicy, 4 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 393, 394 (1987)
[hereinafter Levine(1987»).
15 See e.q., E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985); CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REpORT
TO CONGRESS, IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 (1984); CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1983); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEREGULATION IS MAKING AIRLINES MORE EFFICIENT
AND RESPONSIVE TO CONSUMERS (1985); J. MEYER, C. OSTER, I.
MORGAN, B. BERMAN & D. STRASSMAN, AIRLINE DEREGULATION:THE EARLy
EXPERIENCE (1981); S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986); M. BRENNER, J. LEET &
E. SCHOTT, AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1985); P. DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION (1989); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR FARES AND SERVICE AT CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS
(1989); Goetz & Dempsey, Airline Derequlation Ten Years
After: Something Foul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L.& COM. 927
(1989); Levine (1987) supra note 14.
8economic models prepared by pro-deregulation
economists.16 Nor has it fulfilled completely the
prophesy of doom of those opposed to deregulation.17 This
has prompted some academicians to reappraise the earlier
theories and look for explanations for this deviant
behavior and the debate about the wisdom of deregulating
the industry still continues.
However, all but the most zealous advocates involved
in the debate have conceded that though airline
deregulation has improved efficiency, reduced costs and,
in general, provided consumers with a wider range of
service choice, it has been a mixed blessing. In
particular, concern has been expressed about the effects
of deregulation on airline safety, the post deregulation
industry concentration" the evolution of anti-competitive
practices in the use of computerized reservation systems,
monopoly leverage through the use of hub and spoke
routing, and the over stretching of finances leading to
excessive debt and bankruptcy.
1.3 Scope and Focus of the Thesis
The importance given to these results of deregulation
differs from author to author as do their prescriptions
for the problems faced by the deregulated industry. But
W See infra Chapter 4.
17 Id.
9their study is important for at least three reasons.
Firstly, it provides valuable insight about the nature of
the airline industry and how airlines compete in the
absence of direct government restrictions. Secondly, it is
likely to be useful for policy makers and airline
executives in the united states when dealing with issues
about future policy in the united states. Finally, such a
study would provide useful guidance for nations
experimenting with or contemplating airline deregulation
or privatization. For how other governments perceive the
working of the airline industry under deregulation will
materially affect their own pOlicies in this regard.
This thesis will review the regulatory regime prior
to deregulation, the assumptions and objectives of
deregulation, and the actual working of the deregulated
airline industry, in order to assess the validity of the
claims of some critics that the industry needs to be
reregulated.
This review will reveal that the policy makers had
relied on economic models based on erroneous assumptions
about the nature of airline competition under
deregulation. Consequently, the developments in the
industry were not anticipated by them.
The Thesis will suggest that the existing regulatory
structure is not adequate to deal with the present and
potential problems of the deregulated industry. However, a
10
reversion to a CAB type regulatory system is not
justified.
Instead, what seems to be needed is a determined
effort to strengthen the existing machinery to tackle the
unanticipated problems that have arisen after
deregulation. In addition, will be suggested that it is
necessary to explore the possibilities of using less
intrusive forms of regulatory instruments to supplement
the market and fortify the existing structure. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to try to offer "concrete
solutions" to the problems. What is intended, instead, is
to shift the focus of the present debate from its
fruitless "inadequate antitrust enforcement v. imperfect
(CAB type) regulation" obsession, with its underlying
assumption that "reregulation" is the only alternative to
"deregulation".
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
Chapter 1 of the thesis introduces the subject of the
thesis. Chapter 2 will provide a background of the
regulatory structure which existed in the United states
prior to deregulation, while Chapter 3 will deal with the
transition to deregulation and the changes in regulatory
structure brought about by it. Chapter 4 will deal with
the actual outcome of deregulation in the light of the
presumptions and predictions of the proponents of
11
deregulation. Chapter 5 will consider in more detail the
problem of ineffectual antitrust enforcement. Finally,
Chapter 7 will sum up the findings of the review and
briefly touch upon the policy implications of the
deregulation experience.
Chapter 2
THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE PRIOR TO DEREGULATION
This chapter will discuss some of the salient
features of the regulatory structure which existed prior
to deregulation. In particular it will review the nature
of authority exercised by the civil Aeronautics Board and
the limitations of such regulations.
2.1 The civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the formation
of CAB
Though the basic features of the regulatory scheme
h d b t 1 h 1 . 18 h'a egun 0 evo ve muc ear ler, compre enSlve
government economic regulation of civil aviation in the
United States started with the enactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938.19 The 1938 Act originally
provided for a single agency, the Civil Aeronautics
18 For an account of the origins of airline
regulation in the United States, See BROWN, supra note 3
at 5-10; A. T. WELLS, AIR TRANSPORTATION : A MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE, Ch. 2 (1984); R.E.G. DAVIES, AIRLINES OF THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1914 (1972); Levine, Revisionism Revised
? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981).
19 h .. 1 t . t f b 5T e C1Vl Aeronau lCS Ac 0 1938, Pu . L. No.7 -
706, 52 STAT. 977.
12
13
Authority to supervise both the technical and economic
aspects of civil aviation. By means of an executive order
the regulatory framework initially set up was reorganized
and the civil Aeronautics Authority was renamed the civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB)20. The CAB was charged with the
economic supervision of commercial aviation in the United
states, while the regulation of technical matters was
turned over to an administrator of civil aeronautics,
whose staff was called the civil Aeronautics
d .. t t . 21A mlnlS ra lone
2.2 The Powers and Functions of the CAB
The CAB's regulatory authority contained many
features found in classical public utility type of
legislation.22 Some of them are discussed below.
20 Reorganization Plan 12 of 1940, Section 7(a) 54
Section 7(a) 54 STAT. 1235.
21 See Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote to the civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterword, 42 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
309 (1967).
22 See Generallv, BROWN supra note 3, at 44-60; GEORGE
W. DOUGLAS & JAMES C. MILLER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974); BAILEY et
all, supra note 15, at 11-26.
routes to be served as well the kind of airline service
airlines would have to fulfil in order to be allowed to
27 Id.
14
carrier certification Authoritv
25 BROWN, supra note 3, at 47, NAWAL K. TANEJA, THE
COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY, (1976), at 5-6; WILLIAM A. JORDON,
AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA, EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS (1970),
at 14-17.
24 Brown, supra note 3, at 47; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAw § 1.3.
23 civil Aeronautics Act, section 401(a)-(e), 72
STAT. 754. Under a "grandfather clause" carriers who had
been providing continuous and regular service from May 14,
1938, till August 22, 1938, the date on which the Act came
into force, were entitled to receive a certificate of
"public convenience and necessity". civil Aeronautics Act,
section 401(e).
26 BROWN, supra note 3, at 47-48.
The certificates granted to an airline stipulated the
Moreover, a certificate granted for a particular
2.2 (i)
"city-pair" could also lay down conditions which the
passenger services, an all-cargo carrier or a supplemental
fly on the route for which the certificate was granted.27
or charter service which provided passenger services on a
demand basis. 26
the carrier could provide.25 Thus it was up to the CAB to
classify an airline as a scheduled airline providing
Firstly, no carrier could engage in commercial
aviation without certification.23 The certification
requirement was the most important regulatory instrument
provided to the CAB. 24
15
Such conditions could stipulate the minimum number of
scheduled flights the airline would have to operate over a
particular time period or could direct the airline to stop
at specified cities along the route.28 The airline thus
had no discretion about whether or not it would fly non-
stop between a city-pair, nor about the minimum number of
flights it would operate in a particular time period.29
Finally, no certificated airline could discontinue
its routes without the permission of the CAB.3o The CAB
was thus given effective control over entry into and exit
from the air transport market. The requirement of
certification enabled the CAB to control both the total
number of airlines in the industry and the total number of
airlines on particular routes. Its classification power
made it possible for it to control the structure of the
industry, i.e. the number of airlines providing passenger,
cargo or supplemental services in the industry as a whole
and on particular routes.
28 Id.
29 Id. However, the civil Aeronautics Act did reserve
some discretion to for the managers of regulated airlines
when it stipulated that "no term, condition, or limitation
of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air
carrier to change schedules, equipment, accomodations, and
facilities for performing the authorized service and
transportation," (Civil Aeronautics Act, section 401(j»,
a provision which resulted in the non price competition
between carriers.
30 BROWN, supra note 3, at 47; TANEJA, supra note 25.
the economic needs of each air carrier and to insure the
was also responsible for channelizing direct subsidies to
required to file tariffs with the Board specifying their
16
Rate Fixinq Authority
32 civil Aeronautics Act, section 1002(d), 72 STAT.
31 civil Aeronautics Act, section 1002(d), 72 STAT.
In addition to this broad rate fixing power, the CAB
35 BROWN, supra note 3, at 49.
36 civil Aeronautics Act, section 406, 72 STAT. 763;
See BROWN, supra note 3, at 49.
33 civil Aeronautics Act, section 1002, 72 STAT. 788;
See BROWN, supra note 3, at 49.
34 civil Aeronautics Act, section 1002(d) ,72 STAT.
78.
788.
788.
own accord or in response to a complaint from a third
2.2(ii)
35air carriers of government payments for mail transport.
minimum rates.M
The Board was authorized to fix mail rates according to
maintenance and continual development of the air
transportation system.36 with all these powers, the CAB
party if it ruled that the existing rate was "unjust or
unreasonable".~ The CAB could also fix maximum and
Secondly, the CAB was given extensive authority over
the fixing of rates for air services.31 Carriers were
32rate schedules. The CAB could change such rates on its
17
virtually dictated the nature and amount of revenue a
carrier would earn.
2.2(iii) Control Over Economic Relations Of Carriers
Thirdly, the CAB was given extensive control over the
economic relations of airlines with other certificated
airlines and common carriers like trucking firms.37 Such
control was exercised in two ways: First, proposals for
mergers, acquisitions and consolidations of airlines
38needed CAB approval. This requirement included any
purchase lease or other contractual arrangement among
carriers. Clearance was also needed for interlocking
directorates.39
Second, inter-carrier operating agreements and
cooperative working arrangements also required CAB's
assent.40 Cooperative baggage handling, joint equipment
maintenance or ownership, cooperative passenger ticketing
facilities, pooling of resources or earnings, sharing of
losses and other such features of airline operation
required clearance from CAB.
37 civil Aeronautics Act, Section 408-413, 415, 72
STAT. 767-772, 774.
38 Civil Aeronautics Act, section 408, 72 STAT. 767.
39 civil Aeronautics Act, section 409, 72 STAT. 768.
40 civil Aeronautics Act, section 408, 72 STAT. 767.
management as demanded by the CAB. The CAB also had the
Since many of the inter-carrier agreements approved
Act could raise antitrust issues and entail prosecution
18
Investigations, Inspections And Compliance
Antitrust Exemption Authority
Fourthly, the CAB had the authority to exempt
2.2 (v)
43 civil Aeronautical Act, Section 415, 72 STAT. 774.
42laws.
41 civil Aeronautics Act, section 416(b), 72 STAT.
775. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 50.
42 civil Aeronautics Act, section 415, 72 STAT. 764.
Finally, the CAB was authorized to investigate
containing such information about its operations or
by the CAB in accordance with the standards of the 1938
furnish periodical and special reports to the CAB
competition as well as enforce its orders and regulations
and monitor compliance.43 Carriers were obliged to
deceptive trade practices and unfair methods of
the carriers immunity from prosecution under the antitrust
under the Antitrust laws, the CAB was empowered to grant
as from prosecution under the Antitrust laws. The CAB
2.2(iv)
could exempt any carrier from the application of a CAB
regulation if it felt that doing so was in the public
. t t 41ln eres .
carriers from the operation of its own regulations as well
19
statutory authority to inspect carrier records and
facilities.
2.3 CAB Ambivalence Towards Competition
The declaration of policy contained in the civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 laid down that:
"Section 2. In exercise of its powers and duties under
this Act the Authority" shall consider the following
among other things as being in the Public interest, and
in accordance with the public convenience and necessity-
a) The encouragement and development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the present and
future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
united States, of the Postal Service and of the National
defence;
b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner
as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of,
assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound
economic conditions in, such transportation, and improve
relations between and coordinate transportation bv, air
carriers;
c) The promotion of adequate, economical and efficient
service bv air carriers at reasonable charoes, without
unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
44 Referring to the civil Aeronautics Authority which
was replaced by the CAB in 1940. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
20
d) Competitionto the extent necessaryto assure the
sound developmentof an air transportationsystem
properly adaptedto the needs of the foreignand domestic
commerceof the United states,of the Postal Service,and
the nationaldefence;
e) The regulationof air commercein such manner as to
best promote its developmentand safety; and
f) The encouragementand developmentof Civil
Aeronautics.,,45
This multiple and potentially discordant list of policy
goals had a marked influence on the nature of CAB
regulation and development of the industry prior to
deregulation46• In formulating its policy the CAB had to
balance the two primary statutory objectives: the
promotion of the industry and its regulation.47
In this regulatory scheme competition had a
complicated role. The legislative requirement of fostering
"competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
48development of an air transportation system", suggested
that the airline industry was expected to benefit from
45 civil Aeronautics Act, section 102, 72 STAT. 740,
as originally passed. Subsequent amendments to the Act
till the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
and the International Air Transportation Competition Act
of 1979 continued with the same policy statement except
for minor changes.
46 See qenerally, RICHARD CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS
REGULATORS (1962).
47 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 51-54.
48 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
21
competition. However, the caveat against "unfair or
destructive competitive practices",~ the recognition of
the advantages of "improv(ing) the relations between, and
coordinat(ing) transportation by air carriers", and the
mandate to encourage and develop air transport, reflected
the view that mere reliance on competition would not be
desirable.
Consequently the CAB's attitude towards competition
was ambivalent at best. Competition was okay so long as it
was controlled and regulated by the CAB. Or else it was to
be discouraged. This attitude prompted the CAB to extend
its regulatory reach to any unregulated section of the
aviation industry which posed a competitive threat to the
CAB certificated air carriers.50 By using its
classification authority the CAB pursued a policy of
carrier segregation and prevented them from directly
competing with the certificated trunk airlines.51
The civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 had "grandfathered"
into the regulatory framework 16 carriers which had been
operating when the Act was passed.52 These carriers,
classified as trunk carriers, were primarily engaged in
49 Id.
50 BROWN, supra note 3, at 53-54.
51 Id., at 55.
52 See supra note 23.
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scheduled passenger transport but were also authorized to
transport cargo and provide charter service.53
The CAB created six additional carrier classes for
the continental United states: Local Service, Supplemental
(or Chartered) Service, All Cargo, Commuter, Air Taxi and
Helicopter54• In addition, special classifications were
created for carriers operating exclusively in Hawaii and
Alaska, and for international carriers who were not
permitted to fly on domestic routes. 55 By this
classification system, the CAB not only influenced the
structural development of the industry, but it also
protected the trunk airlines from competition by not
granting trunk classification to any new airline.56
53 BROWN, supra note 3, at 54.
54 Id., at 55.
55 Id.
56 Id., at 54-59. As a result the original trunk
airlines (whose number had reduced to 10 from 16 in the
intervening years) accounted for approximately 90% of the
domestic passenger market at the time of deregulation.
Moreover, the CAB was also very restrictive about granting
any of the other classifications to new airlines. Due to
this, by 1970 the eleven trunk airlines earned 86.5% of
the total industry revenue, while the nine local and
thirteen supplemental airlines earned 10.3% and 1.3%
respectively. The CAB certified only two all cargo
carriers and their share of the total industry revenue was
a paltry 0.7%. The three helicopter services, two intra-
Hawaii carriers and the four intra-Alaska airlines
certified by it accounted for a meager 0.1%, 0.6% and 0.4%
respectively. Though obtaining classification as a
commuter airline or an air taxi service was relatively
easy, severe restrictions on the type of aircraft and the
routes made them practically non competitive with the rest
of the industry. See also DOUGLAS & MILLER III, supra note
23
The CAB was more open to the idea of permitting entry
of existing carriers into new city pair markets than of
new carriers into the industry.57 However, its policies
in this regard were still very restrictive.58 Though an
established airline usually did not have the problem of
showing that it was "fit, willing and able" to provide air
transportation, it still had to demonstrate that the there
was a "public need" for the new route authority. If the
concerned route was already served by another carrier the
CAB would normally not grant the necessary certificate if
the incumbent objected on the ground that the new entry
would divert traffic and cause financial hardship for
it.59 Consequently, competitive routes were awarded only
if they did not significantly affect the profitability of
the incumbent airline.
Obviously the CAB gave greater stress on the policy
objective of fostering "sound economic conditions" and
improving relations between, and coordinating
transportation by air carriers, than it did to promote
"competition" among the carriers. The resulting
relationship between the CAB and the industry was
22, at 121-122; BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 13.
57 DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 22, at 113; BAILEY et
all, supra note 15, at 14.
58 MEYER & OSTER et all (1981), supra note 15, at 6.
59 Id.
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paternalistic: the CAB "provided the industry with
parental support and protection, while exercising in turn,
60a strong measure of parental control."
Monopoly route awards were often given to the
applicant in the weakest financial position in an attempt
to strengthen that carrier and maintain stability in the
. d t 61 f .t dln us ry. Pro 1 able routes were also awarde to
compensate airlines which flew on uneconomic routes like
those serving small communities.62 The CAB's pricing
policy also reflected its focus on overall industry
profitability rather than on the relationship between
f d
.. 63 •ares an costs ln partlcular markets. Prlce
competition was generally discouraged.64
60 ROBERT C. FRASER, ALAN D. DONHEISER & THOMAS G. MILLER,
JR., CIVIL AVIATIONS DEVELOPMENT: A POLICY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS, 67 (1972).
61 MEYER & OSTER et all, supra note 15, at 6.
62 Id.; BROWN, supra note 3, at 71.
63 This was prompted largely by the need to reduce
payment of subsidies on unprofitable routes. The Board
relied on "internal subsidization" of a carrier's route
system for this purpose. Revenue from a carrier's more
profitable routes was used to subsidize losses on
unprofitable routes. The internal subsidy strategy
eliminated the possibility of a carrier making an excess
profit on one route while requiring government subsidy on
another route, a practice which had the potential of
becoming a politicaL liability. BROWN, supra note 3, at
71.
64 Under Section 902(d) of the civil Aeronautics Act
(72 STAT. 784), tariff violations were criminal offences
and there were very few instances of "illegal" price
cutting. Indeed, the CAB's across-the-board fare
authorization provided a mechanism through which the
25
2.4 Limitations to CAB Regulation
In spite of its vast authority to regulate almost all
facets of the airline industry, the CAB had to function
under certain limitations.65 Firstly, the due process
requirements stipulated by the regulations for changing
routes were time consuming, especially in contested cases.
Additions to the route system were required to be dealt
with on a case by case basis and the CAB rules did not
provide for a general overhaul of the route system. As a
result it had to rely on a piecemeal approach to rectify
66shortcomings in the route system.
Secondly, so long as a permanently certified carrier
observed the conditions of its certificates, the CAB could
not unilaterally revoke or substantially reduce the
67authorization granted to it on economic grounds alone.
This meant, in effect, that any increase in route
68authorization became a permanent feature of the system.
Thirdly, though the CAB could compel a carrier to
provide a minimum number of flights between a city pair or
airlines could act as members of a price-fixing cartel.
Once the price was approved it became binding on all and
the CAB assumed the role of enforcer of the agreement. See
JORDON, supra note 25, at 62-72; DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra
note 22, at 140.
~ BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 11-14.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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to halt at one or more intermediate stops, it could not
prevent an airline from providing more service than the
CAB thought "adequate". The carriers could do this by
either increasing the frequency of flights or by using
69bigger aircraft or by both. The CAB, thus had no
effective means of controlling the total capacity of the
airlines.
The above features of the regulatory system, coupled
with the CAB's policy of discouraging price competition
led airlines to compete by offering greater frequency of
flights70 and on flight facilities like gourmet food and
wine and entertainment.71 In order to attract passengers
airlines also acquired the latest models of airlines in
preference to older models, even if the latter were more
suitable.72 The existing aircraft were also replaced much
sooner than was probably necessary. The new aircraft were
69 Id.; BROWN, su?ra note 3, at 92-93.
70 By offering more convenient schedules than its
rivals, a carrier tried to obtain a greater than
proportional market share. See PAUL BIEDERMAN, THE U.S.
AIRLINE INDUSTRY, END OF AN ERA (1982) 131.
71 BROWN, su?ra note 3, at 67, 92-93.
72 An example of this was the acquisition of wide
bodied jets. Biederman's study shows that the older narrow
bodied aircrafts did not suffer from any disadvantage due
to the introduction of the wide bodied aircrafts. On the
contrary, in the case studied by him the operator of the
narrow bodied aircraft effectively counteracted the
introduction of the new aircrafts by offering a more
convenient (and higher level of) service frequency,
another form of nonprice competition device. See BIEDERMAN,
supra note 70, at 126-130.
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generally more expensive and had larger seating
capacity.73 As a result, airline costs and capacity
increased.74 But due to the CAB's pricing policy which
provided the industry with an assured rate of profit, the
airlines' profits were not significantly affected.75
Even where the new technology resulted in lower
operational costs, the consumers of the air services did
not benefit through lower fares. Instead the savings were
used by the airlines for financing further non-price
competition strategies.76 The increased capacity of the
n "(T)he carriers ... were driven to keep adding
aircraft until they were constrained by the inability to
finance new equipment or the inability of manufacturers to
supply more planes." JONATHAN L.S. BYRNES, DIVERSIFICATION
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATED AND DEREGULATED INDUSTRIES: LESSONS FROM
THE AIRLINES, 31 (1985); BROWN, supra note 3, at 93.
74 BYRNES, supra note 73, at 31, 58. This practice did
encourage the development of the u.S. aircraft
manufacturing industry and lead to technological
innovations which allowed it to remain a leader in the
field. However the costs were fully borne by the consumers
of the u.S. airline industry.
75 The CAB considered selection of equipment, like
scheduling of aircraft, to be an "inviolate management
prerogative" and the use of new and more modern aircraft
"a legitimate method of management" for differentiating an
airline product from that of its competitors. BROWN, supra
note 3, at 93, referring to Gellman, The Regulation Of
Competition In United States Domestic Air Transportation:
A Judicial Survey And Analysis, 28 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND
COMMERCE, 148, 161.
76 Since the rates for airservices was controlled,
there was little scope for individual airlines reducing
the same. Nor was it in the interest of the airlines to
show exceptionally high profits as that would invite
attention of the regulators and raise accusations of
"unreasonably high levels of profits".
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out.
79 Id.
Id.80
is a surge in air travel. In order to fulfil its
The airlines industry is particularly sensitive to
78 BROWN, supra note 3, at 67.
CAB's regulation of route, price and service competition
paternalistic role and "protect" the industry, CAB policy
through periods of high profits and passenger demands, it
was more liberal towards competition.79 Consequently, the
during the 1938-1970 period tended to assume alternatively
an anticompetitive and procompetitive character.8o These
77 In fact it permitted the airlines to take
advantage of increased demand for air services in the
short run. Since the price could not be increased in
response to the increased demand, the airlines could
increase their revenue only by carrying more traffic.
2.5 The Cyclic Nature Of CAB Requlation
travel falls; during periods of economic prosperity there
cycle. In times of economic adversity the demand for air
during periods of economic decline was deliberately
anticompetitive.78 However, when the industry went
general economic conditions and the swings in the business
airlines posed no problems when the industry was
experiencing growth.77 But during times of economic
adversity and low demand, excess capacity could lead to
severe problems unless the CAB stepped in to bail them
29
cyclical swings in the CAB's policy roughly corresponded
with the general financial cycles in the industry.81
In part, the CAB's policy swings were also in
response to the increased political pressures from various
groups affected by airline regulation.82 Some of these
groups, like the major trunk carriers, financial
institutions and other entities with a large stake in the
financial security of the major airlines, adopted a pro-
industry approach to the question of airline
regulation.83 They argued that the CAB's role was to
insure the financial health of the industry and ensure
that it was self sufficient and not dependant on
government subsidy.84 Pressure from these groups was
likely to be the strongest during periods of economic
diff icul ties. 85
In contrast, other groups, like consumer
organizations and small businesses, argued that CAB should
promote low cost air services that were widely available
to the pUblic.86 Interest in air travel was heightened
81 Id.
82 Id. , at 67-94.
83 Id. , at 60-61.
84 Id.
85 Id. , at 62.
86 Id. , at 63.
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when the economy was doing well and the demand for air
travel was high. 87
Each position advocated its own distinct set of
policies. In general, the first group emphasized strict
regulation while the second favored more competition.88
Thus the cyclical turns in its regulatory policy also
reflected the CAB's attempt to manage the two competing
sets of expectations about its regulatory role.89
However, the CAB's institutional constraints permitted it
to deal with these political and economic problems only to
a limited extent. When the economy really took a plunge,
it could no longer act as the "safety valve" which
stabilized commercial air transport.90 As will be seen in
the next chapter, the CAB's unsuccessful attempt to play
its role during times of extreme adversity provided the
necessary opportunity for the critics of regulation to
bring about its ultimate demise.
87 Id. , at 62.
88 Id. , at 62-64.
89 Id. , at 62.
90 See infra Chapter 3 .
CHAPTER 3
THE TRANSITION TO DEREGULATION
3.1 RATIONALE FOR REGULATION
Economic regulation of the airlines was justified on
the ground that air transportation was a strategic public
utility which required special regulatory treatment. 91
This claim rested on three basic assumptions~:
1) That it was necessary for a regulatory agency to design
aviation route networks in order to ensure the development
of an integrated and socially desirable service
network. 93
Without such route making, it was argued, the
airlines would fly only on the more profitable routes and
neglect routes with thin traffic. Public interest required
that the benefits of air travel be uniformly distributed
geographically.
91 See qenerall Y, P. CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY, A
STUDY OF DOMESTIC AIRLINE PASSENGER FARES (1958); F. GILL & G.
BATES, AIRLINE COMPETITION (1947); S. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND
COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION (1961); Bluestone, The
Problems of Competition Amonq Domestic Trunk Carriers
(parts 1 & 2) 20 J. AIR L.& COM. 379 (1953), 21 J. AIR L.
& COM. 50 (1954)
92 BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 1-2.
93 Id.
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2) That to promote the development of the desired air
service network it was necessary to provide incentives for
carriers to operate on uneconomic routes.94 This could be
achieved either through direct subsidies or by allowing
the airlines to cross subsidize the uneconomic routes by
charging higher rates on more busy routes.
To enable them to do this, price competition had to
be avoided and the number of airlines on a particular
route had to be restricted. Rate and route regulation was
thus considered essential.
3) That unregulated competition in the airline industry
leads to duplication of services and facilities without a
corresponding increase in the demand for such services.95
Further, it prevents the realization of economies of
system integration. To ensure optimal utilization of
resources, airlines must be strictly regulated.
For these reasons it was considered necessary to
grant monopoly or near monopoly rights to carriers on
certain parallel routes or within particular regions.96
Since the number of such routes or regions in a country
was necessarily limited, this meant that entry into the
industry had to be severely restricted.97
94 rd. , at 2.
95 rd.
96 rd.
97 rd.
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The grant of monopoly rights on routes in turn also
98necessitated regulation of rates. To protect consumers,
it became essential to prevent airlines from exploiting
their monopoly position by charging too high a rate. At
the same time the rates had to be fixed at a level which
would ensure that the airlines covered their costs and
earned a "reasonable profit". The scope for competition in
such a regulatory scheme was obviously limited.
The report of the Federal Aviation Commission of 1935
aptly summed up the consensus in official and academic
circles about the role of competition in the airline
industry when it recommended that:
"It should be the general policy to promote competition
in the interest of improved service and technological
development, while avoiding uneconomical paralleling of
routes or duplication of facilities ... On the other
hand, too much competition can be as bad as too little.
To allow half a dozen airlines to eke out a hand-to-mouth
existence where there is enough traffic to support one
really first class service and one alone, would be a
piece of folly. ,,99
3.2 Theoretical Challenqe to the Basis for Requlation
While the CAB's regulatory policy till the beginning
of the 1970's was largely in line with the this attitude
98 rd.
99 Report of the Federal Aviation Commission of 1935,
quoted in MEYER et all supra note 15, at 19.
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asserted that there was no evidence available to show the
Eleven years later, Richard Caves, on the basis of
AN INDUSTRY
100See qenerally, BROWN, supra note 3, at 42-93.
1M M. Levine, Is Regulation Necessary ? California
Air Transportation and National Requlatory Policy, 74 YALE
L. J. 1416 (1965).
brought out the dramatic difference in the performance of
102 R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS
STUDY (1962).
lW Constitutionally and statutorily, the CAB had no
authority over purely intrastate airlines which could be
regulated only by the state concerned. The Californian
airlines operated profitably at prices less than half of
those fixed by the CAB, without any governmental
assistance, and effectively competed with the CAB
certified carriers. Likewise, the texas intrastate
carriers, had lower fares. See MEYER & OSTER DEREGULATIONAND
THE NEW AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS 121-122 (1984).
expressed in academic circles about the justification of
the regulated interstate airlines in the U.S.A., and the
largely unregulated California intra-state airlineslw,
101 L.S .KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR
TRANSPORTATION (1951).
such regulation. As far back as 1951, Lucile Keyes
more empirical evidence argued that the economies of scale
the basic assumptions for regulating the airline industry
need for governmental control over entry into the aviation
industry.l0l But this was greeted with skepticism.
at a system level were insignificant and predicted that
competition would permit rational route choices.l~
However, when Michael Levine, in a 1965 articlelM,
towards airline competition,l°O doubts began to be
35
came under serious and widespread scrutiny by the academic
community. A 1970 study by William Jordon further
t th d . f' d' 105S reng ene Levlne's ln lng.
Based on these empirical observations, economists
like George Douglas and James Miller built sophisticated
models of airline competition in which they characterized
the airline industry as naturally competitive and
suggested that economic regulation should be
d . t . d 106lscon lnue .
107Finally, in a study published in 1975 , George
Eads demonstrated that in spite of CAB subsidies,
regulated U.S. carriers had abandoned large numbers of
small communities. At the same time many of these
communities were being served by a commuter carrier
industry that had no rate or route regulation and received
no subsidies. Further, he found that the scheduling of
service at the communities still served by certificated
carriers, was based more on carrier convenience than on
consumer demand. These findings effectively discredited
one of the basic premises for regulation, that regulation
was necessary to serve small communities with "thin traffic".
105 W.A. JORDON, supra note 25.
106 DOUGLAS & M t 22ILLER, supra no e .
107 George C. Eads, Competition in the Domestic Trunk
Airline Industry: Too much or Too Little, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS (A.Phillips Ed.) 13-54
(1975) .
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Due to these and other works, by mid 1970's an
However it is doubtful whether mere academic consensus
Unpopular CAB Policies
110 Id.
111 Id., at 89-90; DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 22, at 97-
3.3(i)
circumstances this political support was forthcoming.
profits the CAB also permitted discount pricing within
certain limits. l11
liberalized route and rate regulation and allowed multiple
. t 110 t' d' l'carr1ers on some rou es. Due 0 1ncrease a1r 1ne
response, the CAB pursued a pro-competitive policy and
The airline industry had experienced unprecedented
traffic demand from the mid 1960's till 1969.1W In
academic consensus had emerged favoring deregulation.
3.3 Political Support for Derequlation.
108 •structure. As a result of certa1n opportune
without simultaneous and adequate political support would
have been sufficient to dismantle the CAB's regulatory
108 h .. hI'Even tough 1t 1S often stated t at deregu at10n
was a triumph of academics, the political climate had to
be correct for the policy makers to heed this academic
consensus.
109 During this "golden age" of air travel passenger
demand increased dramatically as the recreational travel
industry developed and jet equipment provided more
efficient and economical operations. See BROWN, supra note
3, at 84.
98.
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By 1969, however, the economic conditions had
worsened and the carriers incurred substantial financial
losses.112 The excess capacity which had been building up
all these years caused severe problems as passenger
traffic dwindled.113 As in earlier periods of industry
stress, the CAB reacted by reversing its procompetitive
policies and resorting to several restrictive
114measures.
Firstly it imposed a "route moratorium" with a view
to discourage airlines from expanding their
t. 115opera lons.
Secondly, it used its antitrust exemption authority
to encourage the airlines to negotiate mutual flight
schedule reductions.116
Thirdly, following the Domestic Passenger Fare
Investigations,117 various rate hikes and restrictions on
discount pricing were approved. As a result, average
112BROWN, note 3, at 99.supra
113Id.
114Id. , at 99-101.
115Id. , at 99-101.
116Id. , at 100.
117The Investigations, which lasted from 1970 to
1974, were started after an industry fare hike approved by
the CAB was challenged in court by Rep. John E. Moss and
other Congressmen. Their primary purpose was to establish
standards for future rate decisions. See Lucile Keyes,
Policy Innovation in the Domestic Passenqer Fare
Investiqation 41 J. AIR L. & COM.75-100 (1975).
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. d t f . d b o' 118 •ln US ry ares lncrease y 20~ ln 1974. Certaln
popular schemes like youth and family discount fares were
d . t . d 119lscon lnue .
Fourthly, the CAB stepped up enforcement of charter
regulations in order to prevent charter carriers from
d . t . f h dId t . 120 tlver lng passengers rom sc e u e opera lons. I
also took the unprecedented step of proposing minimum
h t t t k th I t .t . 121C ar er ra es so as 0 ma e em ess compe 1 lve.
Finally, the CAB sought to increase profitability by
mandating airline performance and efficiency
standards.1~ It discouraged management practices which
increased operational costS.1~ In a significant
departure from its traditional laissez faire policy
towards service competition, it sought to put an end to
offering amenities like free movies and beverages, and
mandated more efficient (and less spacious) seating
f . t . 124con 19ura lons.
118 BROWN, supra note 3, at 100, MEYER et all, supra
note 15, at 42.
119BROWN, note 3, at 10l.supra
120Id. , at 100-101.
121Id.
122Id. , at 10l.
123Id.
124Id.
128 Id.
The departments of Transportation and Justice had
unpopular and met with widespread opposition from various
39
Coalition of Interest Groups Opposed to
Regulation
These policies of the CAB proved to be highly
3.3(ii)
127 BROWN, supra note 3, at 101.
inter-carrier agreements increased they were challenged by
initially not objected to the CAB's approval of schedule
127passengers.
125quarters. Smaller and financially more sound carriers
objected to the route moratoriums.126 Airline executives
restraining their ability to provide ancillary services to
interfering with airline management functions, and by
accused the CAB of overstepping its authority by
128reduction agreements. But when the number of such
the Antitrust Division on the ground that the CAB was
abusing its anti trust exemption authority. 129
125 BROWN, supra note 3, at 101-102; MEYER et all supra
note 15, at 31-41.
126 BROWN, supra note 3, at 101; MEYER et all, supra
note 15, at 41.
129 Id.; In addition, by 1974 the list of opponents to
the CAB policies had extended to include the Postal
Service, the City of Chicago, the State of Maryland, and
the then Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Lewis A. Engman. MEYER et all supra note 15, at 41-42 &
nl.
at 104-105.
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program, and most of the CAB certified airlines who had a
supra note 3, at 101.180 BROWN,
131 rd.
132 rd. ,
This universal unhappiness with the policies of the
Basically, the opponents of deregulation advanced the
Consumer groups protested about rate hikes, drop in
labor unions, political groups representing the small
in safety standards. They were in favor of changes in
CAB did not mean that its every critic favored
opponents, the major opposition coming from the airline
carriers charged the CAB of conspiring with the trunk
airlines to eliminate low cost air travel.I:3l
policy within the framework of CAB.
age old arguments for regulating the industry and
towns with thin traffic then being served by a special
flight frequencies, reduction in flight amenities, and
d . t . f 1 dOt f 180 1 t 1lscon lnuance 0 popu ar lscoun ares. Supp emen a
strong vested interest in the perpetuation of the
predicted financial chaos, deterioration of the quality of
derequlation. Deregulation had its fair share of
182regulatory structure.
services, loss of services to smaller communities and drop
41
3.3(iii) Political Scandal
However the opponents soon lost ground as the
Congressional Scrutiny
133Id. , at 10I.
134Id.
135Id.
The combination of political scandal and unpopular
influential politicians and powerful interest groups
brought out that two major airlines had illegally
3.3(iv)
alleged that Timm was instrumental in thwarting a CAB
inquiry into this.1M To make matters worse, it was
the then chairman of CAB, Robert Timm, got involved in a
disillusionment with CAB grew and respected scholars,
contributed to Nixon's reelection campaign and it was
political scandal in 1974 owing to his connections with
the Nixon Administration.1~ The Watergate investigations
rallied around the call for deregulation. On top of this,
Administrative Practices initiated an oversight
policies drew the attention of Congress to the functioning
revealed that Timm had accepted airline hospitality on
of the CAB. In early 1975, Senator Edward Kennedy,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Sub Committee on
trips to Florida, Bermuda and several European
t. 135coun rles.
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various bills for reform of the regulatory system
At the same time, regulatory reform was given top
Presidential Endorsement
137 BROWN, note 3, at 101-102, 107.supra
138 rd. , at 110-114.
139 rd. , at 114-115.
140 rd. , at 115.
3.3 (v)
136 Committee on the JUdiciary, u.S. Senate, 94th
Congress, First Session "Oversight of the CAB Practices
and Procedures.
priority by both the Ford and Carter administrations.
Shortly after becoming President, Carter endorsed the
Cannon-Kennedy bill and galvanized various groups in favor
investigation into CAB policies. 136 The Committee
communities. The proposed bill included an airline labor
groups opposed to deregulation: airline labor and small
which were designed to mollify two politically influential
including one jointly sponsored by Senators Canon and
Kennedy were introduced.139 The bill contained provisions
compensation program and guaranteed service to small
.t' 140communl les.
hearings provided a public forum for those advocating
was followed by Senator Howard Cannon, Chairman of the
Senate Commerce Sub Committee on Aviati~n. 138
deregulation of the industry. Soon Senator Kennedy lent
his support for the move towards deregulation. 137 This
49-52.
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a diverse coalition of influential individuals and
Administrative Deregulation
into an unprecedented political consensus on the matter as
By the middle of 1978 the CAB, on its own accord, had
In the meanwhile, the CAB, under the stewardship of
144 Id., at 116-119; MEYER et all, supra note 15, at
142 Id., at 102, 115.
141 Id.
its extinction, the CAB zealously implemented policies
of deregulation to form an alliance. 141 This snow-balled
legislation, thereby giving policy makers and legislators
Cornell University Professor of Economics, Alfred Kahn,
, If I d h t t d d I t' 1~1tse e t e movemen owar s eregu a 10n. In a
implemented most of the provisions of the pending
manner most uncharacteristic of a regulatory agency facing
3.3(vi)
approximating rate and route deregulation even before
Congress had passed a reform bill.u4
interest groups joined forces to support legislation for
deregulating the industry. 142
143 Kahn's predecessor John Robson had also proposed a
deregulation experiment but it was not accepted. As CAB
Chairman, Robson had also testified before the Cannon
hearings in favor of reducing CAB authority and placing
more reliance on market forces. See, BROWN, supra note 3,
at 117.
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a preview of how a deregulated airline industry was likely
t f t . 145o unc lone
3.4 Derequlation
Fortunately for the deregulators, the CAB's return to
competitive policies coincided with a general improvement
. 146in the economy and the airline lndustry. As a result
airline profits soared in 1977 and 1978, thereby
dispelling fears about adverse consequences of
deregulation.l~ Finally, by June 1978, major opposition
from the airlines had also ended1~ and the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 received Presidential assent in
149October 1978.
A natural extension to deregulation of domestic
commercial aviation was the liberalization of
international aviation. Indeed the proponents of
deregulation were also in favor of a competitive
international airline industry. 150The International Air
145BROWN, note 3, at 126.supra
146Id. , at 126.
147Id. , at 118.
148Id.
149Id. , at 123.
150For a discussion of the proposal of former CAB
Chairman, Alfred E. Kahn on this issue, see RAMON DE
MURIAS, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INTERNATIONALAIR
TRANSPORTATION, 153-157 (1989).
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Transportation Act of 1979151was the international
t t f th . l' 1 t' 152coun erpar 0 e Alr lne Deregu a lon Act.
The Act envisaged the integration of domestic and
international air transportation.1~ The segregation of
"international" carriers and "domestic" carriers enforced
under CAB regulation was done away with and all u.s.
airlines could now seek permission to fly on u.s.
international routes. Due to the nature of the
international system however, which is based on bilateral
exchange of air traffic rights, the Act contemplated
increased access by foreign carriers to the u.s. markets
only if benefits of a similar magnitude were afforded by
th d f . t t . 154e concerne orelgn governmen s 0 U.S. carrlers.
The International Act, thus, though professing to open up
the market and promote competition, did so only for the
u.s. carriers. Competition from foreign airlines was to be
tolerated only to the extent u.s. airlines could get
similar advantages in the foreign country concerned.
151Pub. L. No 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
1~ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss
the International Air Transportation Act or the
international repurcusions of deregulation of the American
airline industry. For a discussion of the same see DE
MURIAS, supra note 150, 147-193, and sources cited
therein.
1~ International Air Transportation competition Act,
section 17, amending section 1102 of the Federal Aviation
Act. See DE MURIAS, supra note 150, at 166.
154Id., at 166-175.
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Requlatory structure
3.5 Chanqes brought about by "Derequlation" to the
Phased Termination of CAB3.5(i)
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 contemplated a
156 Id., at 125.
155 See BROWN supra note 3, at 123.
phased termination of direct economic control of the
period the CAB was directed to prevent anticompetitive
agreements was to end by January I, 1983. The CAB was
the CAB itself on January I, 1985. During the transition
airline practices and to place the highest reliance on
t .t . k 155 " f tcompe 1 lve mar et forces . Termlnatlon 0 rou e
Regulation of carrier fares, mergers, and inter-carrier
domestic airline industry with the eventual abolition of
whether the public interest require(d) continuation of the
Board and its functions beyond January I, 1985. ,,156
regulation was to be accomplished by December 31, 1981.
required to report to Congress by January I, 1984 "as to
The 1978 Act provided for the transfer of the CAB's
would be subject to the antitrust laws in the same manner
was to end on January 1, 1989, when the airline industry
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Residual Powers to Department of Transportation3.5(ii)
157 Id.
September 1984 transferred this authority to the
On its termination on January 1, 1985, the CAB's
state and the Postal Service. The administration of the
small-community service program was to go to
transferred to the Departments of Transportation, Justice,
residual powers and responsibilities were to be
Transportation, which was to also work with the State
department on international air service agreements. The
as any other industry. The CAB Sunset Act also allocated
Postal Service was to get the CAB's responsibilities
department of Transportation too. This authority, however,
157regarding mail transport.
residual antitrust exemption authority to the department
of Justice. However the CAB Sunset Ace58 passed in
the CAB's residual consumer protection functions like
158 civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub.
Law No 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703.
1~ This aspect of CAB's responsibilities had been
omitted through oversight in the 1978 Act leading to a
jurisdictional struggle between the department of
Transportation and the Federal Trade Commission. The
regulation of baggage handling and booking rules to the
d t t f t t· 159epar men 0 Transpor a lone
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the "sunset" date.
own economic decisions like other industries. In the
The Theoretical Basis of Deregulation
The regulatory scheme substituted by deregulation was
expected that the market would perform a better job of
airline competition. Based on these assumptions it was
No change was made by either Act to the regulation of
Thus "deregulation" did not mean that the airline
3.6
Sunset Act ended the controversy in favor of the Dept. of
Transportation. BROWN, supra note 3 at 125.
Unchanqed
based on certain basic assumptions about the nature of
influence would be indirect. The airlines would also be
be influenced by the remaining regulations. But such
industry was now freed of all regulation. It essentially
getting approval of the Department of Transportation till
granted exemption from prosecution under the same by
subject to the general antitrust laws though they could be
meant that the airlines would no longer be subject to
course of such decision making the airlines would no doubt
Aviation Administration. (F.A.A.)
airline safety or to the technical aspects of aviation.
3.5{iii) Requlation of Safety and Technical Matters
direct economic regulation, but were left to make their
The authority for this purpose remained with the Federal
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regulatory structure.
These theories based their predictions on certain
Airline Markets Are Highlv competitive3.6 (i)
161 See e.q., CAVES, supra note 46.
First, the ability of airlines to lease aircraft,
obviously mobile, operations were not bound by
major maintenance repairs and services suggested that they
airports and airways, there were no substantial infra-
The justification for doing away with rate, route and
entry regulation was based on economic theory which
geographical constraints. Moreover as airlines used public
inferences drawn from empirically observed characteristics
could expand or reduce the size of their operations
without significant sunk costs. 161 since aircraft were
and suggested that its performance without regulatory
control would approach that under perfect competition.1OO
characterized the airline industry as highly competitive
3.6(i} (a) Cost-less Entry And Exit
of existing airline markets.
rent ground facilities and equipment, and to contract out
regulating the industry than was possible under the CAB's
160 See e.q., S.BRYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 317-318
(1981); Levine(1965} supra note 103; DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra
note 22; JORDON, supra note 25; CAVES supra note 46; Keeler,
Airline Requlation and Market Performance, 3 BELL J. ECON &
MGT. SCI, 399 (1972) .
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structural expenses. From this it was concluded that entry
into and exit from the industry was easy and virtually
costless.
3.6(i) (b) No Economies Of Scale
162Second, studies by some authors had suggested
that there were no significant economies of scale in the
airline industry, and all airlines had equal access to
technology.1M This led to the conclusion that new
entrants to the industry were at no disadvantage merely on
account of their size.
3.6(i) (c) Lower Prices, Lower Costs And Hiqher Capacity
utilization
Third, actual performance of relatively unregulated
markets such as the California and Texas interstate
markets, as well as the less regulated markets like the
chartered markets seemed to suggest that competition among
airlines resulted in reduction of excess capacity leading
162See e.q., Id., at 56; M. STRASHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 90-101 (1969); Gordon, Airline Costs and
Manaqerial Efficiency, in TRANSPORTATIONECONOMICS (National
Bureau of Econ. Research, 1965); White, Economics of Scale
and the Question of "Natural Monopoly" in the Airline
Industry, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 545 (1979).
163Id. In fact the evidence seemed to suggest that
after remaining constant for a wide range of airline
sizes, the unit cost per available seat mile actually rose
for the largest airlines.
3.6(ii)
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to lower costs, lower prices and higher volume of air
164travel.
Cumulatively ease of entry, lack of economies of
scale, lower prices and better utilization of capacity led
economistsl~ to predict that deregulation of the airline
industry would result in cost based pricing, survival of
low cost producers, disappearance of wasteful service
competi tion166, and an absence of opportunity for
successful predationlM: in short, a replication of a
perfectly competitive market.
Airline Competition And The Theory Of
Contestability
One problem with this theoretical framework was the
reconciliation of the perfect competition model with the
observed phenomena that even "unregulated" airline markets
had only a handful of firms. As per conventional orthodox
theory, this suggested the possession of market power, a
result incompatible with perfect competition. This awkward
164 See Levine(1965) su~ra note 103; JORDON, supra note
25.
1~ See e.g., DOUGLAS & MILLER supra note 22; Levine
(1965), supra note 103.
166 Encouraged by CAB regulation.
167 Because of few start up or sunk costs.
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fact was generally ignored by or glossed over by these
.t 168wr~ ers.
After the formulation of the theory of
contestability,W9 this problem seemed to be resolved.
Unlike orthodox competition theory, contestability theory
did not require a large number of competitors. It also
allowed for economies of scale. All that the theory
required was that
1) firms could enter and exit without costs,
2) all firms had equal access to economies of scale and
to technology,
3) there was no scope for operating losses due to
predation or other forms of "strategic" conduct, and
4) there was a set of prices that could occur after the
entry of at least one firm which would support
profitable operation, i.e., the condition of
sustainability.
If these conditions existed, potential entrants would
be able to offer an immediate supply response whenever the
168 Keyes, for instance, used the "monopolistic
competition" model to characterize the airline market but
predicted behavior that was competitive. See KEYES, supra
note 102; Levine used the perfect competition model but
predicted, on the basis of observed reality, that
deregulated airline markets would have a limited number of
competitors. See Levine (1965) supra note 103.
169 See WILLIAM BAUMOL, JOHN PANZAR & ROBERT WILLIG,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982);
BAUMOL, PANZAR & WLLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE: REPLY, 73 AM. ECON. REv., 491 (1983).
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incumbent producers attempted to charge higher than
competitive prices or produce lower than competitive
output. The threat of such potential competition would
compel incumbent producers to maintain price and output at
levels approximating those to be expected in competitive
markets.
The characteristics observed in pre-deregulation
studies of the airline industry seemed to fit perfectly
with the requirements of contestability theory.
Consequently, some economists used the contestability
theory to predict that deregulation would lead to
competitive equilibrium in the airline industry.l70
Events in the years immediately following deregulation
seemed to further confirm these predictions.
The dramatic fall in fares, entry into the industry
of numerous new carriers and the resulting boom in air
travel seemed to vindicate the stand of the pro-
deregulators. The few deviations from their earlier
projections were shortly attributed to "transitional
problems" faced by airlines trying to adjust to
deregulation or to external factors. However, as more time
went by it became increasingly clear that many of the
assumptions about the nature of the deregulated airline
170See Bailey & Panzar, The Contestabilitv of Airline
Markets Durinq the Transition to Derequlation, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 125 (1981); Bailey & Baumol, Derequlation
and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J ON REG. 111
(1984), BAILEY ET ALL supra note 15, at 153-72.
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industry were contrary to reality. The next chapter will
examine some of these assumptions and how the deregulated
airline industry has actually fared in the absence of CAB
regulation.
Chapter 4
The Functioning Of The Airlines After Deregulation
Deregulation had a profound effect on the airline
industry. As administrative action and legislation
demolished the former regulatory restraints, the airlines
had to alter their competitive strategy fundamentally. The
old, time-tested methods were of little utility now. As
the established carriers grew familiar with the changed
circumstances they evolved strategies to remain in
dominance.
While some of these strategies failed, by and large
the major airlines were remarkably successful in meeting
the challenge posed by the low costs and prices of the new
entrants to the industry. As these much publicized low
priced carriers left the arena one by one, bankrupt or
swallowed up by a bigger firm, the euphoria of the early
days of deregulation gave way to a solemn realization that
there was something essentially wrong with the theoretical
projections of the advocates of deregulation.
Most of these projections were based on the
characterization of the airline industry as "naturally"
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established carriers and reduce their dominance of the
Firstly, it had been assumed that new entrants with
Brinq Down Costs And Prices To New Entrant
CAB certificated Carriers Would Be Compelled To
Levels Or Perish
lower costs and higher flexibility would soon overtake the
market unless the latter brought down costs to new entrant
levels.171 The CAB certificated airlines had entered the
of such characterization. This chapter will examine some
of the major assumptions and expected results of
major impediments to contestability which have developed
or come into focus after deregulation.
4.1 Kev Assumptions and Actual Outcome
171 See e.q., MEYER & OSTER supra note 45, at 136-137
("(t}he pressures placed on the established carriers to
reduce their costs ... (have) come from the realization
that with deregulation very low fares based on very low
costs are no longer confined to the intra state markets
and are certain to spread to many or even most markets ...
Not only are new entrants likely to grow and expand, but
... established carriers (will have to) lower their costs
in response to new entrant pressures." See also, BAILEY et
all, supra note 15, at 91-110; Keeler, su?ra note 171;
Levine, Financial Implications of Requlatory Change in the
Airline Industrv, 49 S. CAL. L. R. 645, 655-57 (1976).
has actually functioned. It will then discuss some of the
deregulation and the manner in which the airline industry
4.1(i}
subsequent events have cast serious doubts on the accuracy
competitive or contestable. But, as will be seen below,
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deregulation era improperly equipped for a world of free
competition. Most established carriers had entrenched
labor unions and high labor costs.1n Almost all their
routes, designed under CAB regulation, were high density
linear routes which were highly vulnerable to low priced
t .t . 178compe 1.1.on.
Several established carriers found themselves with
aircraft and equipment suitable for long haul routes,
whereas new entrants had the option of choosing equipment
in accordance with emerging needs. This disadvantage was
compounded by the steep rise in fuel prices which made
several older aircraft obsolete.1U Together they placed
a costly re-equipment cost on the established carriers.
Previous contractual commitments raised costs further.
Finally, these airlines also inherited a management
and corporate culture conditioned by the protective luxury
of CAB regulation. On account of the CAB's policy of
ensuring a fixed rate of profits, the CAB certificated
airlines had got used to employing strategies which
promoted growth rather than profits175• Such a management
172 MEYER & 0 t 104 t 201 202STER supra no e , a -.
178 BYRNES, supra note 73, at 56 (1985).
174 MEYER et all, supra note 15, at 161-188 (the fare
increases made almost one quarter of the nation's jet
fleet capacity economically obsolete).
175 BYRNES supra note 73, at 62.
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entrants.
CAB certificated carriers.
No Incentives For Mergers And vertical
Inteqration Of Air Services
be no incentive for vertical integration of air
services.l~ Rather, it was asserted that integration of
Many of these carriers, however, while adapting
178 The term "vertical network integration" in the
context of airlines has a somewhat different meaning than
the traditional use of the expression "vertical
177See e.q., CAVES, supra note 46, at 56-61.
176Levine(1987), supra note 14, at 407.
there would be no incentive for mergers and
consolidations.l77 It was also posited that there would
Secondly, it was believed that since there were no
significant economies of scale in the airline industry
organization, failed to survive for long. Sooner or later
they either went bankrupt or merged with one of the former
4.1(ii)
their advantages in terms of costs, equipment and internal
With all these handicaps, these carriers were expected to
substantially to the new conditions continued to survive
in spite of above market costS.176 On the other hand,
practically all of the new entrants, not with standing
fare miserably unless they could adapt quickly to the
style was likely to be inappropriate in the new set up.
changed circumstances and bring prices to the level of new
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higher density, longer haul operations with shorter haul,
lower density operations would be inefficient as such
combinations would impose the higher overheads and labor
costs of the former on the latter. Indeed, one of the
expected benefits of deregulation was believed to be the
reallocation of resources from the less profitable
airlines of the CAB era to independent specialized
carriers having cost structures suitable for each segment
of the industry. 179
Both these expectations have been belied. The years
following deregulation have witnessed several major
consolidations and mergers. There has also been a strong
tendency towards integration of international, domestic
trunk line and regional/commuter services, normally
through contractual arrangements which entail code
integration". Traditionally, vertical integration refers
to the common administration by ownership or contract of
different stages of production and/or distribution. The
different stages of the transportation of an airline
passenger from a small town through a connecting hub to
another destination, whether a major metropolitan city or
another small town or to an international destination, are
regarded as the different stages of the transportation
process as each has very different technical and
administrative features. Due to the technical and
administrative differences such a journey is similar to
journey using a multi-modal means of transportation.
Vertical network integration occurs when these different
stages of transportation are carried on under a common
administration either through common ownership or through
contractual arrangements. See Levine (1987) supra note 14,
at 437 & n 151.
179 See G. EADS, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES EXPERIMENT, 31-
74 (1972).
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more or less abandoned the linear route system, and
prevalent under the CAB, as well as in the intrastate
Fare structures Based On Costs
Derequlated Markets Would Have Simole. Uniform
Fourthly, the highly complex fare structure which
Thirdly, an underlying assumption of the proponents
of deregulation was that the linear route structure
182 Id."Hub and spoke" systems concentrates most of an
airlines operations at one or very few "hub" cities
serving all other cities non stop from the hub. The cities
on the spoke are provided connecting service through the
hub.
resulted after deregulation could not be reconciled with
4.1{iv)
4.1{iii) Linear Route structure Prevalent Under CAB Would
continue After Derequlation
sharing, coordinated scheduling and shared market
.d t .t 1801. en 1. y.
instead have relied almost exclusively on "hub and spoke"
182systems.
markets, would be the dominant structure under
deregulation too. 181 In other words, the basic venue for
competition was believed to be discrete city pairs.
contrary to this expectation deregulated airlines have
180 See D. PICKERELL & C. OSTER, A STUDY OF THE REGIONAL
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: THE IMPACT OF MARKETING ALLIANcEs 2, (1986);
Levine (198?), supra note 14, at 410-411.
~1 Levine (198?) supra note 14, at 411.
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either the perfectly competitive market model or the
contestable market model of the airline industry. These
models visualized simple, uniform pricing based on the
costs of the new entrant airlines.u3 "Discount" fares
and other types of restricted discriminatory pricing were
considered to be a result of market power created by the
t .f .. I t t I' d bIt' 184 •ar 1 lcla en ry con ro s lmpose y regu a 10n. Slnce
entry into and exit from the airline industry was believed
to be more or less costless, no such market power was
expected to remain after deregulation. Another underlying
assumption with regard to this pricing model was that the
demand for air travel was similar among most travellers,
i.e., all travellers were equally sensitive to changes in
• 185prlce.
Together, these two factors were expected to produce
a relatively simple and unrestricted price system. 186
183 Id., at 413; Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluatinq
"Derequlation" of Commercial Air Travel: False
Dichotomization. Untenable Theories. and Unimplemented
Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 119-110 (1989).
U4 A limited amount of cost based price
discrimination, like higher peak time rates was however
visualized.
185 MEYER et all, supra note 15, at 56. (Congressional
study based on assumption that unrestricted regular fares
would prevail after deregulation; Carstensen, suora note
88, at 109-110.
186 See Hearings on the Oversight of civil Aeronautics
Board Practices Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
JUdiciary, 94th Congress 1st Session (1975) (Kennedy
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This conclusion was further fortified by observations of
the intra state markets in Texas and California as well as
the charter market. 187
The unrestricted low fares introduced by airlines
such as Peoples Express immediately after deregulation
seemed to support this analysis. When discount pricing
persisted in spite of the rock bottom prices of these new
entrants, they were regarded as part of the adjustment
process by which residual market power was being competed
188away. It was predicted that the complex price
structure would eventually disappear as the airlines would
be forced to lower their costs and simplify their fare
structure or perish.1~ However not only is the highly
complex fare structure very much in vogue today but
contrary to what was anticipated, it is the new entrants
offering the unrestricted low fares which have ceased to
exist.
Hearings) at 35, 52 (testimony of Thomas E. Kauper,
Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice.)
187 . () tSee, Levlne 1965 supra no e 103; MEYER & OSTER,
supra note 104, at 21-24.
1M Or, in the terminology of economists the
"tatonement" process whereby prices are adjusted mutually
over time to reach equilibria. Levine (1987) supra note
14, at 414.
1~ See Call & Keeler, Airline Deregulation, Fares and
Market Behavior, in ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN TRANSPORTATION
ECONOMICS, 221 (A. Daughety Ed., 1985); MEYER et all, supra
note 15, at 71-72.
programs have become an integral feature of the industry.
When American Airlines introduced the frequent flyer
flyer programs, travel agents and computerized reservation
63
Insignificant Role Of Freauent Flyer Proarams.
Travel Aaents And Computerized Reservation
4.1(V)
190 Levine(1987) su?ra note 14, at 414-416.
Systems
Another development which the pro-deregulation
analyst had not anticipated was the central role frequent
191 Id., at 414.
systems (CRS's) would play in the deregulated airline
. d t 1901n us rYe
program in 1980 many observers considered it to be a
k t· . t . ft' I .. f . 191mar e 1ng 1ncen 1ve 0 no par 1CU ar s1gn1 1cance.
4.1(v) (a) Frequent Flyer Programs
Nor should it have been required if an airline enjoyed a
irrespective of whether it has a large proportion of
monopolistic position in the market. However, these
Such bonuses should not have been necessary had the
airline industry been really competitive or contestable.
carrier has been compelled to offer such programs
fare structure. And, in general, the benefits of the
In spite of some initial reluctance, virtually every
monopoly routes due to its hub and spoke systems, or
whether it offers a relatively low and non-discriminatory
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program are available regardless of whether passengers
purchase full fare or discounted tickets.~2
4.1(V) (b) Role of Travel Agents
Deregulation was also expected to diminish the role
of travel agents in the distribution system. Since the
airlines were expected to adopt simplified non-
discriminatory fare structures at the lowest feasible
cost, it was anticipated that they would also adopt
alternative methods of distribution193 which emphasized
on direct marketing and dispensed with "middle men".
However, the constantly and rapidly changing fares,
the enormous range of fares for the same journey and
frequent changes in routes and services has made the task
of evaluating the "best bargains" available at a
particular time very complex for the lay traveller. As a
result, the need for travel agents has grown and there has
been a tremendous increase in the percentage of air ticket
194sales through travel agents.
192 Which excludes any simple explanation which would
justify the benefit on the basis of the cost of the
ticket.
63 Levine(1985) supra note 14, at 414.
194 See BRENNER et all, supra note 15, at 62 (travel
agents' share of total domestic and international air
travel sales rose from 47% in 1973 to 57% in 1978 to 74%
in 1983. The total commissions paid increased from $ 732
million in 1978 to $ 2.4 billion in 1983.)
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4.1(v) (c) Computerized Reservation Svstems
Finally, though Computerized Reservation systems
(CRS's) had started operations even before deregulation,
the deregulators apparently never anticipated the pivotal
role the airline owned CRS's would play after deregulation
and the various ways in which they could be manipulated to
"bias" the system in favor of the airline owning the
195CRS. The frequent changes to a complex system of
airline fares, flight schedules and ticketing procedures
has made the CRS's indispensable.
However CRS's have been used to distort information
received by travel agents and consumers about service
offered by rival airlines as well as for providing over
rides and other incentives to induce travel agents to sell
the tickets of the airline owning the CRS.1OO If an
airline is the owner of the dominant CRS in its own hub
city it can place its competitors in a very
disadvantageous position.
65 Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 415. The travel
agents use the CRS to get flight and fare information for
its customers, issue tickets and boarding passes and
provide ancillary services such as rental car and hotel
reservations. Either due to economies of scale or due to
contractual terms, the agency usually uses only one
system.
66 't d A' I' , 'I t' dSee Unl e lr lnes v. C1Vl Aeronau lCS Boar ,
766 F. 2d 1107, 1110 (1985). The issues raised by the
CRS's is discussed in the next chapter.
reflection of this fact.
lower than its costs and then refusing to raise the same
to operate below cost, and then resume service once the
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Predatory Conduct Under Deregulation4.1(vi)
"7 Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 417.
198 Id. This belief was based on the assumption that
entry and exit were costless.
periodical rate wars followed by increase in fares are a
suggests that, contrary to what was expected, predatory
till the new entrant is financially exhausted or withdraws
from the route. 199 This sort of behavior strongly
standard deregulation analysis had assumed that
predation would not be of concern in the airline
market.197 It was believed that an airline targeted for
predation could simply withdraw from the market and refuse
cost airlines reducing their fares to a level apparently
practices are prevalent in the airline industry and
the post deregulation period abounds with cases of higher
198predator raised fares to compensatory levels. However,
199 Id.; BRENNER et all, supra note 15, at 33-50;
Newspaper reports also periodically feature stories about
fare wars. See e.g., When does a Competitor Cross the Line
to Predator? Investors Business Daily, June 17, 1992
(reporting the filing of suits by continental Airlines and
Northwest Airlines claiming that American Airlines had
engaged in predatory pricing in order to drive them out of
business); Fare Wars Are Becoming A Way Of Life, Bus. Week
Jan 13, 1986, at 102; The Airlines' Dangerous Games with
Fares, Bus. Week Mar 5, 1984 at 33.
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4.1(vii) Deregulation And Antitrust Enforcement
The proponents of deregulation had assumed that the
existing antitrust laws and procedures would be sufficient
to deal with any antitrust issue that could arise under
deregulation. To begin with, it was asserted that
exclusionary or exploitative conduct would be rare. If at
all it occurred it would necessarily (and transparently)
fall within the categories of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws. Moreover, it was assumed that such
conduct, if and when it occurred, would be dealt with by
th t .t ft' 200e an 1 rust en orcemen machlnery.
The actual experience after deregulation seems
contrary to these expectations. The tendency towards
mergers, consolidations and contractual integration has
been very strong in the deregulation era. The resulting
concentration coupled with the evolution of hub and spoke
route systems, frequent flyer programs, instances of
apparent predatory conduct and the dominance of the CRS's
have raised serious concerns about the possession of
market power by the airlines and the antitrust
200 See BRYER, supra note 160, at 32; Cohen, The
Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 28
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 131, 139 (1983); Eads, Airline
Competitive Conduct in a Less Requlated Environment:
Implications for Antitrust, 28 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 159, 179-
83 (1983); Keyes, Notes on the Historv of Federal
Requlation of Airline Merqers, 37 J. AIR L. & COMM. 357
(1971); Phillips, Airline Merqers In The New Requlatorv
Environment 129, U. PA L. REV. 856, 876-79 (1981); White,
supra note 162, at 545, 546 (1979).
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implications of the same. The antitrust machinery,
however, has proved largely ineffectual in dealing with
201these matters.
4.1(viii) Bankruptcies. Debts And Leveraged Buyouts
The high levels of debts and the remarkable stream of
bankruptcies witnessed by the airline industry since
deregulation have been beyond the expectations of the pro-
deregulators. Bankruptcy, in itself, when it is caused
through inefficient management of operations, might not be
a matter of grave concern for the overall health of the
industry. More competitive and advantageously positioned
firms may be expected to take over the assets and put them
to better use.
If the number of firms are small, however, the
resulting concentration of the industry can legitimately
raise apprehensions of abuse of economic power and may
also warrant an investigation to find out whether the
bankrupt company's plight was a result of inept management
or was the consequence of predatory tactics employed by
the "bigger fish", or of any other feature of the
deregulated industry.
Indeed part of the financial problems of airlines
seems to have originated from the frequent rate wars that
have erupted ever since deregulation. The financial over-
201 • f h tSee 1n ra C ap er 5.
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reaching by some of the rapidly growing new entrants may
also have contributed to some of the bankruptcies.
External factors like increase in fuel prices, adverse
economic conditions, increased re-equipment costs and the
like, are also partly responsible for this state of
affairs.
While a certain amount of financial instability was
to be expected as the industry sought to adjust to an
unregulated environment, the precarious financial health
in which the industry finds itself today was certainly not
contemplated. The assumptions of mobility of capital and
cost less entry and exit ought to have permitted airlines
to pullout before they reached the stage of bankruptcy.
The bankruptcies, aside from causing distress to the
shareholders and creditors, has also dissuaded investors
from funding new airlines. Thus potential competition from
such new entrants, on which the contestability theory was
based, seems more and more unlikely. Instead, a different
type of investor - the corporate raider - has been
attracted to the industry. Encouraged by the high levels
of concentration in the industry and the depressed value
of airline stocks, 202 and lured by the prospect of
~2 As airline earnings are subject to cyclical swings
stocks normally sell at a discounted price as compared to
the stock markets normal price-to-earnings ratio. See
Michele M. Jochner, The Detrimental Effects of Hostile
Takeovers. Leveraqed Buyouts. and Excessive Debt on the
Airline Industrv, 19 TRANSP. L. J. 219, 225 (1990). At
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profitable liquidation of the airlines undervalued assets
like air craft, spare part inventories, delivery dates on
aircraft, deposits on airplanes and real estate, and
assured by its hub and spoke systems, computerized
reservation system, and landing slots at crowded airports,
of earning monopoly rents,W3 these raiders have attempted
1 d b t f 1·· l' 204everage uy ou s 0 severa maJor alr lnes.
since these attempts are financed through heavy debt,
a successful takeover means that the debt has to be
serviced by the targeted airline. Even where a takeover
bid is unsuccessful, the incumbent management is left to
bear substantial expenses in order to repel the takeover
bid. In either event the airline ends up with a mountain
of debt. This in turn forces it to take such undesirable
steps as cutting down or postponing essential re-equipment
expenditure, changing the company's capital structure by
times of financial uncertainty in the industry, the stock
prices are likely to be further depressed.
203 See Id., at 225; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Robber
Barons in the Cockpit: The Airline Industry in Turbulent
Skies, 18 TRANSP. L. J. 133-34 (1990). Dempsey also
attributes the power and glamour of owning an airline as a
motivating factor for the takeovers.
204 See qenerally, Dempsey, supra note 203; Jochner,
supra note 202. During 1989, three of the four largest
airlines in the United States, Northwest, United and
American, became targets for leveraged buyouts, loading
them with enormous debts. Four others which had become
victims of leveraged buyouts, Continental, Eastern, Pan Am
and TWA ended up with negative net worth. Eastern and Pan
Am have gone bankrupt while TWA and Continental are on the
verge of bankruptcy.
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expenditure, changing the company's capital structure by
reducing equity and increasing debt, liquidating fixed
assets like buildings and taking them on rent, selling air
crafts and equipment and then taking them on lease.
The problems created by hostile take overs and
leveraged buyouts are not confined to the airline
industry and has been the subject of much controversy and
debate.205 But the effects of such attempts on the
airline industry has been particularly disturbing. Unlike
the earlier airline entrepreneurs and the "new entrants"
attracted by deregulation, the corporate raiders are not
interested in the airline business.w6 Quite often, the
corporate raider launches a hostile tender offer merely to
shake up the market and drive up the airlines' stock price
205 See e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Tarqet's Manaqement in Respondinq to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (takeovers are beneficial as
they lead to more efficient allocation of resources by
substituting competent management in place of incompetent
management); Ginsburg & Robinson, The Case Aqainst Federal
Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control,
Winter/Spring 1986 BROOKINGS REV. 9, 11-14 (takeovers
foster national growth); But see Lipton, Take Over Bids in
the Tarqet's Boardroom: A response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1231, 1233
(1980) (economic benefits of takeovers are debatable); R.
GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 1059-60
(1986) (takeover of local companies poses real threat to
local interests); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age
of Finance corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 125
(1987) (adverse impact of takeovers) .
206 As one observer notes "the aviation industry right
now is being run and acquired by financiers - not aviation
people" Blum, So Is It Really Safe To Fly? Nat'L L. J Oct
2, 1989 at 26 (comments of Richard F. Schaden)
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stock.207 Their primary (and often sole) purpose is to
make quick personal profits at the expense of the airline.
As such they are not concerned with the long term
viability of the airline and their actions are designed to
extract as much as possible from the company in the
shortest possible time.~8
Even if the targeted airline can momentarily avert
bankruptcy and manages to limp along with its unproductive
207Jochner, supra note 202, at 226; See qenerallY
Dempsey, supra note 203. Dempsey cites a two instances:
Denver oil king Marvin Davis launched a $ 2.7 billion bid
for Northwest Airlines. Northwest ultimately fell victim
to a $ 3.7 billion bid by Alfred Checchi while Davis
enjoyed a $ 30 million profit on the Northwest raid.
Similarly, Francisco Lorenzo collected $ 46 million as
"loser's compensation" after he had launched a hostile
take over attempt of National Airlines in 1979. {Pan Am
ultimately acquired National for $ 400 million through a
"white knight" non hostile acquisition.) Lorenzo then
launched a take over bid to acquire continental which he
finally did in 1982. This was followed by acquisitions of
Peoples Express and Eastern Airlines.
208For an account of the manner in which these
corporate raiders have ransacked the airlines they
acquired through leveraged buyouts see qenerallY Dempsey
supra note 203; Jochener, supra note 202. Francisco
Lorenzo, who entered the airline industry via Texas Air
rapidly acquired several airlines through hostile
takeovers and promptly went about the task of bleeding
them to bankruptcy. Philip Baggeley, Vice President of
Standard and Poors Corp. describes Lorenzo's modus
operendi thus: "Mr. Lorenzo has built one of the most
leveraged major corporations in the nation while
insulating Texas Air - and himself - for most of the cost
and much of the risk ... Mr. Lorenzo presides over some of
the nations sickest airlines. All are losing money at some
of the fastest rates in aviation history and rank as the
industry's biggest debtors." Hearinq on Leveraged Buyouts
and Foreiqn Ownership of Airlines Before the Aviation
Subcommittee on Public Works and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess (1989) (statement of Philip Baggeley).
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and back breaking burden of debt, it can hardly be
expected to regain its former competitive strength.
Starved of funds it is compelled to cut down on essential
maintenance and re-equipment expenses which further
reduces its competitiveness and compromises safety. At the
same time it becomes extremely vulnerable to aggressive
competition as well to changes in economic climate or
technology.
It is doubtful whether the proponents of deregulation
visualized the disastrous effects of leveraged buyouts by
corporate raiders. At least the possibility was not
addressed in the deregulation literature. However, in view
of the affiliation of many of them to the Chicago School
of economic thought, it seems likely that many of them
would have subscribed to the view that hostile take overs
are a significant means of displacing inefficient
management and attain better allocation of resources and
should, therefore, be encouraged. Resistance to the take
over bid by the incumbent management would be regarded as
signs of an inefficient management wishing to entrench
.t If 2091. se .
However sufficient evidence exists today to discredit
the theory that hostile take overs invariably lead to a
better allocation of resources and the result of a
successful bid is to substitute a more efficient and
~9 See e.q., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 205.
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to the FAA.
almost two decades safety regulation had been the
Airline Safety
While considerable controversy still exists as to the
Another major assumption of the deregulators was that
necessary to supplement the powers or resources available
economic deregulation would not affect airline safety. For
extent to which developments after deregulation have
affected airline safety, there is a growing consensus that
the deregulators handicapped the FAA considerably by not
CAB had no direct responsibility for aviation safety, its
abolition was considered inconsequential. Since the
4.1(ix}
prerogative of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). As the
2W See e.a., Lipton(1980}, supra note 205;
Lipton(1987} supra note 205.
211 As Jochner notes II (t}he service of needless debt,
brought about solely because of takeover speculation and
individual greed, surely is not the optimum use of
society's capital. These transactions serve merely to
rearrange capital; they do not create capital." Jochner,
supra note 202 at 222.
in the safety equations which would warrant additional
safeguards in the deregulated era, it was not considered
deregulators did not admit of the likelihood of any change
productive management in place of the (presumably)
inefficient and unproductive incumbent.21o It certainly
d t t b th . th . I' . d t 211oes no seem 0 e e case 1n e a1r 1ne 1n us rYe
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contestable market the firms which could make the most
The proponents of deregulation realized the
Scarcity Of Gates And Slots will Not Impede
Contestability
212tasks.
4.1(x)
efficient use of the scarce slots and gates would be able
scarcity of a factor of production (i.e., the scarce
slots, gates and other airport facilities to the
functioning of a competitive airline system.21:3 Mere
airport facility), however, was not considered an
importance of availability and transferability of airline
enhancing the resources available to it for performing its
impediment to contestability. It was believed that in a
21')- See qenerally, J. NANCE, BLIND TRUST: THE HUMAN CRISIS
IN AIRLINE SAFETY (1986); Carstensen, supra note 88; See
also Safety and Rerequlation of the Airline Industry,
Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 100th Congress 2d Sess (1987) at 33
(statement of T. Allen Mc Arbor). However statistical
studies based on airline accident rates show no increase
in accident rates. In fact the rates have declined, a
result attributed to better technology and not to
deregulation. See e.g., Clinton V. Oster, Jr. and C. Kurt
Zorn, Is It still Safe To Fly, in TRANSPORTATION SAFETY IN
AN AGE OF DEREGULATION (Leon N. Moses & Ian Savage Ed.,
1989), 128.
213 See BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 180-184 ; D.
Grether, R. Isaac & C. Plott, Alternative Methods of
Allocating Airport Slots : Performance and Evaluation
(1979) (study prepared for the civil Aeronautics Board by
Polionomics Research Laboratories, Inc., Pasadena,
California); Levine(1965) supra note 103, at 1417.
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to purchase it by paying the "market" price to the
owner.214 Even the vertical integration between airline
owners and slot owners, it was argued, would not impede
215entry. If a slot or gate was more valuable to another
airline than to its present user the first airline was
supposed to be able to obtain it by paying its present
user the "market price". So what mattered was not that the
slot was scarce but whether it was freely
216transferable.
The possibility of an airline not selling its under
utilized or unused airport slot to another airline which
needed it to enter the market was considered irrational
and not admitted.217 But although buying and selling of
slots was permitted for some time in 1983 and has been
legal since April 1986, the airlines have been extremely
reluctant to share its airport facilities with their
214 Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 465-466.
215 Id. (referring to R. BaRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX,
228-31, 240-42 (1978) : vertically integrated firm
maximizes overall profit by selling output at each level
as though the units were independent of each other)
216 Since airport facilities are controlled by local
public authorities, rules about subleasing or transferring
varied. The solution suggested for the access problem was
to make airport facilities easily transferable and avoid
long term leases. See BAILEY et all supra note 15, at 184.
217 See BaRK, supra note 215, 228-31, 240-42 (vertical
integration for the purpose of blocking entry was
irrational as it incurred diseconomies.)
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competi tors218• The airlines have held on to their ticket
counters, gates, ramps and hangar space and have often
avoided making them available to other airlines even when
they were not using them and had no plans of using them in
219the future.
4.2 Airline Competition and the "New Industrial
Orqanization Theory
The deregulation experiment has attracted an
exceptional degree of academic and policy interest. These
surprises of deregulation has led to a reevaluation of the
nature of airline competition. In general, there is a
growing consensus that airline markets are not "naturally"
contestable22o• Contrary to what was believed previously,
there are certain characteristics of the airline markets
which set up or enable an established airline to set up
substantial barriers to contestability. These
218 Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 466.
219 Id.; See also BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 192-
193 (cites two cases : a) Laker Airways inability to get a
gate or terminus space at JKF Airport even though National
Airlines had unused space suitable for this purpose and b)
TWA's reluctance to sublease space to Eastern at Los
Angeles. )
220 • () t 11See e.g., LeVlne 1987 , supra no e 14; Ca &
Keeler, supra note 189; (contestability theory
inappropriate for analyzing deregulated airline markets) ;
Marius Schwartz, The Nature and Scope of Contestability
Theory, in STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION (D.
Morris, D. Sinclair, M. Slater & J. Vickers Ed., 1986);
BAILEY, supra note 15, at 153-171.
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Some of these factors are discussed below.
the airline industry.
Information Exhibit Economies Of Scale And Scope
Costs Of Developinq And Communicating
First, the cost of developing and communicating
222The new industrial organization theory has
developed from the works of economists like Frank Knight
[F. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1951); F. KNIGHT, RISK
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921)], Ronald Coase [R. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); R. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & ECON, 1 (1960)], and in a
more modern context, Oliver Williamson [OLIVER WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONSOF CAPITALISM (1985)]. It focuses on
the relationships between the firm and the various
economic actors interacting with it, and on the strategies
employed by them to achieve their respective objectives at
the minimum cost.
221Levine(1987) , supra note 14 at 444-480.
information about routes, schedules, seat availability,
223Economies of scale refer to advantages resulting
from the gross size of the airline. Economies of scope
refer to advantages enjoyed by an airline from a wide
variety of airline products offered in a large number of
markets.
4.2(i)
production indivisibilities which were ignored by
economics of information, principle-agent effects and
conventional perfect market and contestabilty models of
identify several of these barriers. Most of them arise on
223account of the economies of scale and scope created by
the ability of airlines to exploit factors such as the
characteristics have been highlighted by Levine221 who
has used the "new industrial organization theory,,222to
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also non-recoverable or "sunk" costs.
business where the customer generally pays before
69 J.225 t' 1 h . f ft'See S 19 er, T e EconomlCS 0 In orma lon,
POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
226 . ( ) tLevlne 1987 , supra note 14, a 427.
Airlines sell under the same brand name many
An airline must make consumers aware not only that it
224Th . ft' t th 1 tese ln orma lon costs are no e on y cos s
which an airline has to meet. A new airline, even one
which intends to run its operations with leased aircraft
and facilities, must incur certain non-recoverable "ramp
up" costs. See Levine, Airline Deregulation: A
Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 687, 688 (1992).
different products, such as different fare and service
specific, so that advertising by one airline does not
signif icantly benef it another,,226
awareness. The repetition of communication over time
delivery. The investment in communication is highly brand
serves as reassurance of reliability and durability in a
place and an acceptable level of safety. "Each contact
with the customer is cumulative, creating memory and
offers, but also of such service characteristics as
exists and of the package of prices and services it
is exceptionally high for a new airline. These costs are
schedule reliability, probable longevity in the market
has to incur expenses for packaging and disseminating such
information,~5 the investment required for this purpose
service features and prices are considerable in the
airline industry. 224While any new business enterprise
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types, in different city pair markets. These products are
sold to many customers in many different locations.
Filling the seats requires communicating simultaneously
with geographically dispersed customers with diverse
travel needs using a common medium. The indivisibilities
associated with the most efficient of public media, large
metropolitan newspapers and network television, make it
much more efficient to offer more than one airline product
• 227to the widest possible audlence.
Thus, though the cost of physically providing the
service may not display economies of scale, the costs of
communicating information do exhibit economies of scale.
From this, it follows that a big airline with a large
network of routes and a wide variety of products, is at a
distinct advantage over one offering a limited number of
destinations and fare types, for it can spread its
communication costs over a much larger range of services.
In addition to these economies of scale the economics
of information also makes it cheaper for an established,
well known airline to offer increments to its service as
the public already associates it with broadly acceptable
standards of service. These "economies of scope" also
makes it easier for an airline to offer an additional
product to a person who has already used it. The same
customer who buys a business ticket between Atlanta and
227 Id., at 429.
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New York may want to travel later on a leisure ticket from
Atlanta to Orlando or on an international excursion ticket
from Atlanta to Paris. Once the consumer has become
familiar with an airline she can economize on search costs
by using it for more than one service.
In such a situation an established airline with a
wide network is again at a decisive advantage as the
likelihood of it being able to offer the service which the
customer subsequently wants is much greater. To
counteract, even partially, such advantages, a new entrant
must make a disproportionally large amount of non
recoverable investment in information generation. Thus
these economies of scale and scope act as a considerable
impediment to contestability.
4.2(ii) Principal-Aqent Effects
The second major factor which has shaped developments
in the post deregulation period is the attempt by the
airlines to exploit the "principal-agent" problems created
due to the difficulty on the part of principals (in this
case the employers of persons travelling on business, and
the customer of air tickets,) to monitor the opportunistic
behavior of their agents (the employee flying on business,
and the travel agent booking the ticket on behalf of the
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customer) .~8 The extremely complicated and ever changing
fare structures of the deregulated airlines has made it
practically impossible for employers to monitor whether
their employees always use the most efficient and cost
effective mode of transportation when they travel on
business. Likewise, it is difficult for an average airline
customer to check with certainty whether her travel agent
is in fact giving her the least expensive ticket available
for the journey. This provides possibilities for these
"agents" (i.e., the employee and the travel agent) to
reduce their search efforts (i.e., shirk) or, when
possible, to even profit at the expense of their
principals(i.e., indulge in opportunistic behavior).
The airlines have successfully taken advantage of
this situation by designing frequent flyer programs and
travel agent incentive programs with non linear reward
structures, in which the value of the award per mile
increases as the total number of miles flown
increases.2~ In addition, they also provide higher
228The principal-agent problem is not specific to air
transportation. The problem was identified by Knight in
1921. See KNIGHT(1921) supra note 222, Ch 8. For a modern
treatment of the problem see Ross, The Economic Theory Of
Aqency: The Principals Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134
(1973); See also, Alchian & Demsetz, Production,
Information, Information Costs and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) iFor a general survey of
principal agent literature see Rees, The Theory of
Principal and Agent (Parts 1 & 2), 37 BULL. ECON. RES. 3
(1985), 37 BULL. ECON. RES. 37 (1985).
229 •Levlne (1987), supra note 14, at 432-433.
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rewards for more expensive classes of tickets. These
programs exploit the principal agent problem by giving the
agents an incentive to "cheat" or "shirk" while the
"artificial" economies of scale presented by the non
linear reward structure enables the airline to benefit
230from economies of scope. The larger the number of
destinations offered by an airline the easier it becomes
for the participants of these programs to earn the more
231 212desirable awards' , and the more attractive' .
While smaller or "specialist" airlines can, and do,
offer frequent flyer programs or travel agency overrides,
due to the economies of scope these programs generate,
they are at a big disadvantage as compared to a large
airline with a wide network. So by designing travel agents
incentive schemes and inventing frequent flyer programs,
big airlines have created "artificial" economies of scale
and scope which further impede the contestability of the
markets.
230 Id. at 432-433, 452-458.
231 Incentive programs for travel agencies are
designed to reward travel agents both for increase in
market share in particular city pairs and for increase in
total business generated by the agency. Due to the non
linear award structure a travel agent would find it more
advantageous to book passengers on airlines offering a
wider variety and larger volume of services.
232 A wide array of destinations not only enables
customers to accumulate sufficient miles to get a desired
award faster it also gives her greater choice regarding
which city to fly to. This flexibility adds to the
attractiveness of the scheme.
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4.2(iii) Production Indivisibilities
A third barrier to contestability is the
indivisibilities involved in serving particular city
• 233palrs. An airline must be able to offer at least 2 or
3 flights a day in a market to achieve minimal market
acceptance. More frequent service often gives a
competitive edge to an airline as it allows customers to
economize on search efforts. At the same time it must also
provide an air craft of a minimum "acceptable" (or
available) size. The central problem of traffic scheduling
in the industry is how to fill all these seats so that the
airline generates sufficient revenue to make its services
viable.
The hub and spoke system is an efficient and useful
technique of overcoming these indivisibilities so as to
allow frequent service in many city pairs whose traffic
density would not otherwise support it. Hub and Spoke
systems create genuine benefits.~4 But they also impede
contestability.
Due to these indivisibilities airlines need to sell
seats on the same flight in a number of markets and at
different prices. While doing this the airline aims to
extract the highest possible revenue from the different
customer groups it combines on the same flight. To do this
233 Levine(1987), supra note 14, at 434-436.
234 Id., at 441-444.
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the airline must be able to do two things. First, it must
be able to develop a sufficiently large hub operation (or
better still a system of multiple hubs) to be able to tap
customers wishing to travel to different destinations from
the same spoke city and to reap the advantages of the
"economics of information."
Second, it must be able to efficiently exploit the
principal-agent problems in order to attract high yield
traffic, i.e., customers like business travelers who are
not price sensitive. Attracting high yield traffic means
that frequent flights can be supported with fewer
passengers. It also means that the airline will be able to
attract more passengers in the price sensitive segments by
offering them cheaper fares.
Thus, the existence and size of an airline's hub and
spoke system, in conjunction with its ability to
effectively exploit economies of scope and scale described
above, determines the degree of success it has in reducing
the indivisibilities of production inherent in the airline
business. This means that if a new entrant wishes to enter
in a position of competitive strength, it must do so on a
very large scale.235 Obviously this implies that a new
235 As Levine observes, "(an) airline large enough to
exhaust production indivisibilities at even a medium sized
city hub is already a pretty big airline. None of the
(medium sized) cities being used as a hub ... supports
more than two such airlines, and most support only one. A
would be entrant at a hub city must therefore be prepared
to displace an incumbent. At the other end of the scale,
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production divisibilities.
236the small towns to the hub and spoke system ..
The Need For Vertical Network Integration and
Code Sharing
4.2(iv)
237 Id., at 439.
236 Id., at 437-441.
their journey. Since the incremental cost of adding such
But the small number of passengers in individual
as part of a much longer journey. As a matter of
typically have to fly the short haul leg of their journey
made sense for the major airlines operating hub and spoke
passengers to an already functioning hub system is low it
convenience passengers normally prefer to travel on the
entrant is placed at a major disadvantage by these
Traffic originating at or destined for small towns
same airline for both the short and the long haul part of
systems to try to tap this major source of feed by adding
towns and the "production indivisibilities" in this case
efficiently served by the commuter airlines using their
made it totally uneconomical to provide jet service to
these towns.~7 Technologically, these towns were more
the same situation is created with respect to entry into a
spoke market large enough to support only one airline
offering the minimum level of service in jet aircraft of
minimum size for any given set of traffic flows. An
entrant in such markets must completely displace the
incumbent." Levine(1987) , supra note 14, at 444-445.
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small propeller driven aircraft and non-unionized
labor.238 Vertical integration through long term contract
seemed to be good way of getting this valuable feed
traff ic and not compromising on operating efficiency. 239
But the biggest advantage of such integration came from
the same economies of scale and scope described above.
The vertical integration involved sharing of a common
reservation code which identified the services offered by
the commuter as part of the service network of its major
partner, adopting common marketing strategies and also
making some changes in the set up of the commuter to make
it more visibly identifiable as an associate of the major
airline.
Such an arrangement worked well for everyone. It
allowed the major airline to take advantage of the
economies of scope arising from adding the smaller towns
to its route network. The airline was also assured of an
important source of feed traffic. The passengers
benefitted by economizing costs involved in looking for a
"convenient" connection, by getting the short haul portion
of the journey also credited to their frequent flyers
account with the major airline, and by getting easier
238
Id., at 440.
239 By retaining their separate legal status the
airlines could take advantage of the lower labor costs of
the commuter airlines and avoid the complications of
.merging union and nonunion staff.
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connections to cities served by it. The travel agents
gained as they also received commission overrides from the
major airline for bookings made on the short haul portion
of the journey. And the commuter airline could also take
advantage of the economies arising from marketing under a
national brand and being part of a major route network.
with such obvious advantages there was a scramble on the
part of the major airlines to get commuter partners and
soon virtually every major commuter airlines was tightly
t· d t f th . t . 1 . l' 240 d thle 0 one 0 e maJor na lona alr lnes an e
same position continues till today.
However, this process of vertical integration, while
producing efficiencies for the parties involved, also
raised considerable barriers to entry. The arrangements
took away or preempted feed from the commuters to other
airlines, existing or potential, thereby affecting their
ability to set up or maintain a competitive hub and spoke
system at the same location as the acquiring firm's own
hub or at a hub positioned so that it served the same
traffic flowS.241
240 See qenerally, PICKEREL & OSTER, supra note 180.
241 Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 441. Alfred E.
Kahn, Market Power Issues in Derequlated Industries, 60
ANTITRUST L. J. 859, 860 (1992).
but offered them on more restrictive terms. At the same
most attractive awards to the use of less discounted
information to match the fare levels of their new entrant
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Complex Fare structure
As the major airlines grew more sophisticated in
4.2 (v)
better known airline. They also introduced hidden capacity
price the customer was likely to choose the bigger and
dealing with the information intensive environment of the
When faced with price competition from new entrants
on any route, they took advantage of their economies of
by following a policy of targeted pricing or "yield
management,,242.Their frequent flyer programs tied the
deregulated era, they devised methods to maximize revenue
them to divide aircraft capacity into sub units and sell
fares. Computerized inventory management programs enabled
Such capacity controls enabled them to sell only that many
243them on different terms to different market segments.
controls on apparently "unrestricted" discount tickets
which were priced at or below the new entrant's prices.
242This type of pricing structure which is the result
of price discrimination according to the differences in
customers' elasticity of demand, is known as "Ramsey
Pricing". See generally, Ramsey, A Contribution to the
Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. (1927). For a journalistic
account of how discriminatory prices are used by airlines
to maximize revenue see Off Course, The New York Times,
Sept 1, 1991.
243 . () t tLevlne 1987 , supra no e 14, a 449-450.
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tickets at discounted rates as could not be sold at higher
rates within a certain black out time. It also allowed
them to vary the ratio of tickets sold at different prices
on different terms for each flight.
To be effective such a strategy required computerized
inventory controls and market segmentation based on
substantial and real time informational capabilities. The
major airlines, with their computerized reservation
systems, frequent flyer programs and travel agents
incentive schemes had both of these244• While the new
entrant and smaller airlines could and did also follow
suit and have their own "discriminatory" price structure,
the lack of immediate access to the databases of the
computerized reservation systems prevented them from
obtaining similar market intelligence. As the rivals could
not be sure of how many discounted tickets would be sold
by the incumbent on a particular flight, it had to sell a
disproportionately higher number of discounted tickets
just to ensure that it did not lose any price sensitive
customer. What emerged were complicated and ever changing
fare structures which allowed the major airlines to
achieve a relatively higher total revenue while pricing
fewer passengers out of the market.
Such a price structure constitutes a major obstacle
to the contestability of airline markets as they enable
244 Id., at 451-452.
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the incumbent airlines to respond quickly, cheaply and
selectively to the prices and outputs of new entrants
245without conferring a similar advantage to the latter .
The new entrant, already burdened with the costs imposed
by the economics of information, has to rely on guess work
and incomplete information to react to the incumbents
prices.
Moreover, as an incumbent with an established hub and
spoke system can spread its overheads and costs of
operation over routes where it does not face competition,
it becomes relatively easier for it to earn sufficient
revenue to increase the frequency of its flights in
markets where it faces competition from the new entrant.
The incumbent can use this ability to maintain frequent
flights in the face of vigorous price competition and to
use that frequency to attract passengers, with further
d 1 t· fft· t t .t 246e e erlous e ec on 1 s compe lor.
The cumulative effect of all the above factors has
been to reduce the number of airlines in the industry to a
handful of mega carriers who dominate the U.S. skies and
are in a position to repel the challenge of any small new
entrant. Even among them, the extensive route networks and
computer reservation systems of the largest three along
with their ownership of the majority of airport slots in
245 Id.
246 Id.
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the country has placed them a very strong post ion as
compared to the rest of the industry. These airlines have
been accused time and again of indulging in
anticompetitive conduct with a view to oust the relatively
smaller carriers.
This situation has led to demands for strong
antitrust enforcement but the record of the enforcement
machinery has not been encouraging. The next chapter will
discuss some of the antitrust concerns which have arisen
in the wake of deregulation and try to analyze the reasons
for the ineffectiveness of the antitrust enforcement
machinery.
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"When airline deregulation was enacted there were 23
not enforcing antitrust laws has permitted the
(t)he number of
If the federal government
The result was 40 carriers ••. Today
domestic airlines. Within six years they were joined by
airlines in operation has dwindled to 11 and three are
The widespread concern about inadequate antitrust
three intrastate and 14 start-ups of significant size.
dominance of computerized reservation systems by the very
development of three glaring barriers to competition: the
largest carriers, the growth of frequent flyer programs
operating in bankruptcy ••• The government's policy of
constrained airports
continues to abandon its responsibility to enforce
antitrust laws, eventually the flying public may be left
with just three mega carriers - American, Delta and
United"u7
the unfair allocation of landing rights at capacity-
that lock customers into using only the largest carriers,
CHAPTER 5
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE INDUSTRY
enforcement was brought out in a recent newspaper article
in the following words:
U7 Perspective On Air Travel; Deregulation: An Idea
Gone Wrong - The New Fares Will Create Hardships For Many
Passengers And Make It Hard For All But A Few Huge
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This popular perception of the desperate need for
antitrust enforcement is shared by many academicians.2~
The proponents of deregulation had assumed that the
existing antitrust laws and enforcement machinery would
adequately take care of any antitrust issues which might
arise after deregulation.u9 The actual experience after
deregulation has been contrary to these expectations.
The tendency towards mergers, consolidations and
contractual integration has been very strong in the
deregulation era. In addition, several airlines have
exited the market via bankruptcy. As a result the industry
has become highly concentrated.
The antitrust implications of this concentration has
been voiced in various forums. Other major concerns in the
antitrust arena have been about the frequent instances of
apparently predatory practices, the misuse of computerized
reservation systems, and the problems created by the major
airlines possessing most of the nations scarce airport
facilities like airport slots and gates.
carriers To Compete, Los Angeles Time, Apr 23, 1992 (Metro
ed.) Part B, p 7.
248 See e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory
Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1987); Barry E. Hawk,
Airline Derequlation After 10 Years - The Need For
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement and Intergovernmental
Aqreements, 34 ANTITRUST BUL. 267, (1989); Louis B.
Schwartz, Some Additional Safeguards for the Newly
Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1049 (1987).
249 d' t tSee supra note 200 an accompanYlng ex.
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The antitrust enforcement machinery, however, has
failed to adequately address these concerns. This chapter
will discuss these problems and attempt to analyze this
failure.
5.1 Consolidations. Mergers And Acquisitions
Antitrust law does not prohibit every kind of merger
or acquisition which increases industry concentration.
What is pertinent is the competitive impact of the merger
or acquisition. It is only when the transaction
substantially reduces competition in the market or tends
to create a monopoly that it is proscribed by the
anti trust laws. 250
The assessment of the competitive impact of a merger,
however, is complex. A court doing traditional analysis
has to first define the relevant market, measure the
shares of the merging companies before and after the
merger, and draw inferences from these facts as well as
from other factors such as barriers to competition, the
strength of other competitors, the likelihood of potential
competition and the competitive style and history of the
parties to the merger. Since a transaction may have both
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, the court has
to further decide whether the procompetitive effects
offset the anticompetitive effects.
250 section 7, Clayton Act.
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In the case of the airline industry the compelling
drive towards mergers and vertical network integration can
be partly attributed to the economies of scale and scope
discussed in the last chapter. As observed there, size and
reputation are crucial for survival in the airline
industry. If two new entrant airlines merged, the
resulting airline would undoubtedly benefit from the
economies of scope which the larger route network would
provide. But it would still have to reckon with the
superior technological and informational advantages of a
major carrier with an established brand. 251
An easier method to obtain the same advantages would
be by merging with a established carrier. Many of the
mergers in the earlier days of deregulation were probably
prompted by such considerations. However, in several cases
these efficiency justifications probably masked the real
intention of the larger of the merger partners - to get
rid of a bothersome competitor.~2
When determining whether the transaction should be
allowed because of its procompetitive effects a valid line
of inquiry is whether the same efficiencies could be
251This would include such factors as the major
carrier's goodwill and brand name, CRS, existing frequent
flyer programs, possession of scarce airport facilities,
and an operating hub and spoke system.
252Kahn, supra note 248, at 1064 ("It is not merely -
probably not even primarily - the ability to offer better
services that motivates the linkage of route systems;
rather it is the ability to control traffic.")
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obtained in some other manner. Some of the efficiencies
brought about by such consolidations could probably have
been attained through cooperative marketing ventures using
a common brand name. However, such joint ventures to
exploit economies of scope suffered from some serious
disadvantages.
To begin with, they raised problems of monitoring the
services offered under it to counteract interfirm
principal-agent, free riding, and other problems created
by opportunistic behavior of the parties to the joint
253venture. Moreover, the effects of such interdependence
was likely to be long lasting, making the need for joint
ff t 1 t 254 . 11 h .. te or more or ess permanen. F1na y, suc )01n
ventures would have been indistinguishable from horizontal
division of markets and could have resulted in prosecution
under the antitrust laws.~5 So, ironically, the
antitrust laws themselves may have been partly responsible
for the spate of airline mergers observed in the eighties.
Whether a court would have considered such mergers as
anticompetitive in balance, however, has become academic
today because the agencies responsible for scrutinizing
such mergers for most of the last decade simply approved
them.
253Levine(1987), supra note 14, at 431.
254Id.
255Id.
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The residual authority to review airline mergers and
acquisitions, originally vested in the CAB, was
transferred to the Department of Transportation (DOT) by
the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984256• This
authority ended on Jan I, 1989, from which date the
responsibility of antitrust scrutiny devolved on the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. During the
intervening years between the passage of the Airline
Deregulation Act and the assumption of this function by
the Justice Department, practically all of the proposals
for mergers and consolidations were approved by the CAB
and the Department of Transportation (DOT). 257 At times,
approval was given in spite of opposition by the
• 258Department of Justlce.
Using a "functional" approach to merger analysis
which focused "on factors that affect competitive
performance (and) not on concentration statistics," the
256 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
257 See Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 409, & n 77.;
Hawk, supra note 248, at 280-82.
258 Id. For example, the DOT unconditionally approved
Northwest's acquisition of Republic, TWA's acquisition of
Ozark, and United's acquisition of Pan Am's Pacific
Division.; See also Donald T. Bliss & Jacob M. Lewis,
Overseeinq Competition in the Airline Industrv: Will the
Transfer to Justice Department Make a Difference ? 34 FED
B. NEWS J. 293, n. 13 (Sept, 1987) referring to D.O.T.
orders - NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, Order No 86-7-81
at 1 (July 31, 1986); TWA-Ozark Acquisition Case, Order
No. 86-9-29 at 2, (Sept 12, 1986); Pacific Division
Transfer Case, Order No 85-11-67, at 16-17 (Oct 31, 1985).
See also Kahn, supra note 248, at 1062-63.
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DOT concluded that none of the mergers or acquisitions
were anticompetitive as the participants did not have
259market power.
As a result of these approvals industry concentration
rose significantly, 260 bringing forth strong criticism
about the DOT's permissive attitude from both proponents
and opponents of deregulation.261 This perception of
259 Bliss & Lewis, supra note 258. Apparently the
analysis was based on two rather questionable assumptions.
The first was about lack of market power, a result of
characterizing the airline industry as perfectly
contestable. The second was that mergers inevitably
increase efficiencies. The DOT's analysis thus boiled down
to two unsupported propositions: 1) that potential
competition was a sufficient safeguard against antitrust
violations; and 2) that all mergers were presumptively
procompetitive.
200 The exact estimates vary but there is a broad
agreement that concentration has increased significantly.
See Hawk, su~ra note 248, at 275-280; FEDE~ T~E
COMMISSION, THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF THE
EvIDENCE, 18 (1988) In 1978, there were 36 certified
carriers and the four largest carriers accounted for 57.4%
of total revenue passenger miles, while the eight largest
airlines accounted for 80.9%. By 1987, the number of
carriers had fallen to 25, and the four largest carriers
accounted for 66.4% of total passenger revenue miles,
while the eight largest carriers accounted for 90.3%.
Since then several other airlines have gone bankrupt and
left the market so the industry is even more concentrated
today.
261 See. e.a. Testimony of C.F. Hitchcock, Aviation
Consumer Action Project, Proceedings before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. (March 25, 1987) at 8 ("merger proposals
that would have been laughed out of the room a few years
ago will sail through today."); Testimony of A.E. Kahn,
former Chairman of CAB, Proceedings before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. (March 25, 1987) at 2 (criticizing
D.O.T.'s "inadequate appreciation of the importance of
aggressive antitrust policy in keeping the airline
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inadequate federal antitrust enforcement was echoed by the
state governments as evidenced by the frequent
participation of their state Attorney Generals in aviation
merger cases to express concern about the impact of the
increasing concentration in the industry on the air
services in their states.2~
The criticism and resultant calls for expedited
transfer of antitrust review authority to the Justice
263Department, as well as the subsequent assumption of
this function by the Antitrust Division, however, has made
little difference to this situation. The experience with
the other antitrust issues that have arisen after
deregulation shows that the antitrust enforcement
machinery has been equally inept at handling them. Three
industry competitive and so continuing the promise of
deregulation. ") See also Kahn, supra note 248, at 1062.
Though Kahn still felt at that time that airline markets
were sufficiently contestable he emphasized on the need to
preserve competition through the antitrust laws. ("In my
opinion, the contestability of airline markets does not
afford sufficient protection ... a competitor in the
market is worth six potential contestors in the bush.")
262 See e.g. Comments of the Attorney Generals of New
York and West Virginia, USAir-Piedmont Acquisition Case,
Docket No 44719 at 3 (March 28, 1987) (pointing out that
the "share of the largest five airlines measured by
revenue passenger miles skyrocketed from 54.7% in January
1986 to 71.8% in 1987").
263 See, e.g., 133 CONGo REC. S3619-20 (Daily Ed.
March 20, 1987) (remarks of Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) on
the introduction of a bill to accelerate the transfer to
fall, 1987 instead of Jan, 1989 as contemplated by the
Sunset Act.
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of these issues are briefly examined to illustrate this
ineffectiveness.
5.2 ComDuterized Reservation Systems
The immense complexity and volume of information
generated by the airline industry after deregulation has
made electronic data processing indispensable. The
Computerized Reservation Systems (CRS)264, developed by
some of the major airlines has automated the booking and
ticket writing functions of travel agents and enabled them
to keep track of the constantly changing routes, flights
and the availability of different kinds of tickets on
different flights. Due to the exorbitant cost of
developing a CRS only five airlines had been able to
. thO CRS t 265 Th ... I'acqu1re e1r own sys ems. e rema1n1ng a1r 1nes
264 American Airlines and united Airlines separately
marketed the first commercial CRS's in the late 1970's.
See P. EHLERS, COMPUTERIZEDRESERVATION SYSTEMS IN THE AIR
TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 4 (1988); Note, The Leqal and Requlatory
Implications of Airline Computer Reservation Systems 103
HARVARD LAw REVIEW 1930 (1990).
265 American (SABRE), United (APOLLO), Eastern
(SYSTEMONE), TWA and Northwestern(jointly) (PARS), and
Delta (DATAS II) Of these SABRE and APOLLO together have
more than 75% of the CRS market, while the remaining three
shared the balance 25%. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
STUDY OF AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS, 159-169.
Systemone is currently owned by a partnership between
Texas Air Corp subsidiary and a General Motor subsidiary.
See Note, supra note 264 at n. 10. Through a merger
blessed by the Antitrust Division Delta, Northwest and TWA
merged their CRS's to form Worldspan in February 1990.
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Capabilities
to compete effectively.
Competitive Advantaqe Conferred bv CRS Ownership
airlines.
loyalty they compete, i.e., frequent flyers and
have had to use these CRS by paying fees to these
manner than their non-CRS owning rivals;
5.2(i)
The extremely sophisticated CRS technology has given
The ownership of a CRS gives the major airlines
seats on different flights in a much more efficient
poses a major impediment to competition. In addition, they
several advantages. While a large part of this gets
translated into more efficient operations, the
also enable the airlines to indulge in certain kinds of
technological and strategic advantages the CRS's offer
activity which affect their non-CRS owning rival's ability
5.2(i) (a) Enhanced Manaqement And Market Monitorinq
owner airlines by allowing it
the major airlines a distinct advantage over the non-CRS-
1) to improve management techniques by enabling it to
manage the complicated, layered200 inventories of
2) to monitor more effectively the agents for whose
200 The practice of charging different types of
customers different prices for the same journey on the
same flight.
11
travel agents, and use that information to segment
markets more efficiently by designing awards that
would present customers with the requisite scale an<
scope incentives to ensure loyalty; and
3) to obtain market intelligence about the users of th.
CRS including its rivals and, thereby, device bettel
and faster competitive strategies.
As a result of this market intelligence and enhancec
information monitoring and processing capability, the CRf
owning airlines are able to keep tabs on their travel
agents and check the effectiveness of their efforts to
induce travels agents to divert customers to their
flights.267 They are also better able to monitor the
success of new incentive schemes or discount fares in
attracting greater traffic or revenue. If the airline
controls the system on which the majority of bookings are
made, as is usually the case with the dominant airline ir.
a hub, it gets the additional advantage of obtaining a
very accurate picture of both its own and its rival's
business patterns. In contrast, an airline without acces
to the information generated by the CRS knows only the
travel patterns of its own customers. It has no way to
effectively monitor its frequent flyer programs or travel
agents incentive schemes. It is also unable to get a
2~ Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 460-61.
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complete picture of the success or failure of a marketing
initiative, advertising campaign or service change.2M
Due to this advantage, the CRS owner can not only
operate more efficiently, but it can also use the market
intelligence gained from the system to distort market
signals to its rivals and lead them to make wrong
inferences from the market~9. If the CRS owner finds
that a rival's strategy is becoming successful, it can
counteract that through targeted secret incentive
programs, or by selective measures aimed at nullifying the
rival's gains. Not only does this enhance the owner
airlines' ability to respond rapidly and selectively (and
therefore cheaply), it also can give the rival airline the
wrong impression about the appropriateness of its
strategy.
S.2(i) (b) Abilitv Raise Rivals Costs Or Bias The
Distribution Channel
The CRS's also provided their airline owners the
opportunity to exploit their technological capabilities to
impair their competitors competitiveness. One practice,
which was fairly common till it was outlawed by a DOT rule
making, was to bias the primary display screens of the
computer terminals so that the flights of the CRS owner
2~ Id., at 461-62.
269 Id., at 462.
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would get a preferential treatment from the travel agents
using it. Another practice was to charge the non owner
airline excessively high rates for using the system.
Several regulations have also been made to address these
types of problems. 270 Allegations about more subtle forms
of bias are still leveled and a bill has been introduced
in Congress for dealing with them271•
5.2(i) (c) Ability to Earn Incremental Income
Finally, even if the terminals are not biased and the
CRS user charges are not exclusionary, the CRS owner still
earns a hefty revenue from booking fees and user
charges.272 This "incremental revenue" places the maj or
airlines in a superior competitive position and also acts
as significant barrier to contestability.
270 • d t t . tCarr1er-Owne Compu er Reserva 10n Sys ems, 49
Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,562-4 (1984). For a description of
some of these abusive practices, see Republic Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 796 F.2d 526 (DC Cir. 1986);
United Airlines v. civil Aeronautic Board, 766 F.2d 1107,
1115 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding regulations)
271 See Air Competition Bill Reaches Key Juncture,
States News Service (On Line Lexis) June 30, 1992,
(referring to H.R. 5466, Airline Competition Enhancement
Act, 1992 )
272 dAm' A . l' d th $ 1 0~ er1can 1r 1nes earne more an 0
million from its CRS, SABRE, in 1991.
CRS owners have been denied reasonable access.
claimed that CRS"s are essential facilities to which non
incremental income earned from the CRS seriously inhibits
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Antitrust Challenges against CRS Owners :
Limitations of Conventional Antitrust Laws
The lack of equal access to technology and the
Although the Supreme Court has never precisely
explained the "essential facilities" doctrine274, courts
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. CRS litigants have also
5.2(ii)
have labeled these practices unfair and anticompetitive. A
number of challenges against CRS owners have been brought
by the non-CRS-owning airlines, including claims of
monopolization and attempted monopolization273 under
the competitive strength of their non-owner rivals who
have relied on it to require a monopolist to provide its
declare a facility essential if competitors cannot
competitors reasonable access to a facility deemed
essential for continued competition.2~ A court may
274See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw P 736. la,
at 699-701 (Supp. 1989).
275 S k' .. hI dee. e.q., Aspen S llng Co. v. Aspen Hlg an s
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); otter Tail Power Co. v.
united States, 410 U.S 366 (1973); Associated Press v.
united States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 570 F. 2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
m . tSee. e.g., In re Alr Passenger Compu er
Reservations System Antitrust Litigation, 694 F. Supp.
1443 (C. D. Cal. 1988); In re "Apollo" Air Passenger
Computer Reservation System (CRS), 720 F. Supp. 1068, 1075
(S.D.N. Y 1989).
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reasonably duplicate it without experiencing a severe
handicap and if rivals cannot meaningfully compete without
access to it.276 An essential facility claim need not
show that the plaintiff has been totally excluded from
access to the facility; it may also allege that the terms
on which access has been given access are highly
277unreasonable.
The CRS owners have never denied non-owners the use
of CRS facility for booking tickets and, therefore, the
complaints have been about allegedly exclusionary
practices like biasing of screens, unreasonably high user
charges and discriminatory contracts with travel agents.
Most of these have been taken care of by regulations
f d· t 278rame 1n recen years.
276 See e.q., Hecht, 570 F. 2d at 992; Tye,
Competitive Access: A Comparative Industrv Approach to the
Essential Facilitv Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L. J. 337, 346
(1987); Note, Rethinkinq the Monopolist's Duty To Deal: A
Leqal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential
Facilities" 74 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1988).
277 See e.q., Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co. 665
F. Supp. 1493, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (upholding an
essential facility claim where the defendant's terms were
unreasonable)., aff'd 880 F.2d 297, reh'g en banc granted,
889 F.2d 264 (11th Cir. 1989).
278 See e.g., Carrier-Owned Computer Reservation
Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 255 (1988); Computer Reservation Systems, 54 Fed 38,870
(1989) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255); Display of Joint
Operations in Carrier-Owned Computer Reservation Systems,
49 Fed. Reg. 9430, 9433 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §
256); U. S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, 1985 REpORT OF THE DEPARTMENTOF
JUSTICE TO CONGRESS ON THE AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEM
INDUSTRY (1985); u. S . DEPT OF TRANSPORT, STUDY OF AIRLINE
COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS (1988); U. S. DEPT OF TRANSPORT,
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That still leaves the very real barriers to
contestability posed by the superior technological
capabilities and market intelligence that the CRS confers
on its owner. Indeed, it effectively upsets another
condition for contestability, that of equal access to
technology. The scope of removing these remaining barriers
through the use of the antitrust laws seems limited.
Technical superiority and rents attained through
investment in technology development, even if it
"unfairly,,279disadvantages a firm's competitors, are not
considered the proper target of the antitrust laws.28o
Even if a court holds that the CRS is an essential
facility, the CRS owner can be required to provide
reasonable access to other airlines only to the extent
necessary to book tickets through it. The CRS owner would
AIRLINE MARKETING PRACTICES: TRAVEL AGENCIES, FREQUENT-FLYER
PROGRAMS, AND COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS (1990).
2m Merely because a competitor would find it
unprofitable to invest heavily on developing a new CRS
does not give him a right ask one who has made such an
investment to forego all its benefits and play on a "level
playing field". Indeed the charge of unfairness could also
be leveled by the CRS owner who has invested such a
substantial amount in developing the system if it is not
allowed to benefit by the superior efficiencies it
permits.
280 See e.q., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1093
(1980) ("a large firm does not violat § 2 simply by
reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its
efficient size nor does an integrated business offend the
Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from
association with a division possessing monopoly in its own
market" )
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not be obliged to give its competitor full access to the
other facilities (like market intelligence and management
281programs) the CRS offers.
The situation is not much different if the basis of
the challenge is the offence of monopolization. To prove
monopolization a plaintiff in such a case would have to
demonstrate both market power in the relevant geographic
and product markets and the "wilful acquisition of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident. ,,282 The showing of market power should
not be very difficult, especially if a hub on which the
CRS owner operates is chosen as the relevant market. But
the problem of establishing that the market dominance was
not a result of a superior product, business acumen or
historic accident would be extremely difficult to solve.
These difficulties probably explain why, in spite of
so much regulatory interest in the CRS problem, the
regulators have confined their efforts to remove bias and
281 The CRS owners do supply the other airlines with
raw data tapes on a slightly delayed basis. The receiving
airline has duplicate software already in existence to
extract the information from the raw data tapes as the CRS
owner does not supply the software. Aside from the delay
which might inhibit immediate response to competitors
actions, the cost of extracting the information also
impedes contestability. See Levine(1987) su~ra note 14, at
463, n.197.
~2 United State v. Grinnel, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966) .
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other such exclusionary practices relating to the actual
operations of the computerized reservation system, rather
than trying to deal with the problems raised by the
vertical integration of CRS owners and airline owners.
While several persons have suggested that divesture
is the correct solution to this vexed problem, others have
283considered such a remedy too extreme. The matter
remains unresolved.
5.3 Control Of Airport Slots And Facilities
Airline obsession with acquiring and holding on to
airport assets like airport slots and gates, and their
reluctance to part with them even when they are not in
use, might partly be due to a fear on their part that
airport operators would impose rules which would make it
more difficult to acquire airport assets in the future.
Holding on to these scarce resources could also be a
strategy to preempt competition or raise rivals costs.
Whatever be the motive, the principal effect of
controlling large amounts of unused or under-utilized
airport assets is to reduce the possibility of successful
entry into the market by airlines not owning such assets
and restricting the growth of airlines with limited number
of airline assets.
283 See e.g Levine(1987) supra note, 14 at 482; Kahn,
supra note 241, at 857, 861 & n.15 (1992).
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airline.
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Holding on to scarce airport resources also creates
284 •Levlne(1987), supra note 14, at 470.
While this type of conduct can be a subject of an
Depending on the extent of facilities the incumbent
For example, by forcing it to adjust its schedule to the
ability of other airlines to organize a new hub, establish
a specialized geographic or customer service, or even make
a spoke entry in the airport concerned. Moreover, by
controlling airport services the incumbent can frustrate a
availability of a gate, the incumbent may be able to
new entrant's efforts to attract traffic to its service.
keeps out of circulation, its actions may inhibit the
Finally, by not allowing the new entrant to use its under-
disrupt the new entrant's connections at a distant hub.
leverage possibilities for the incumbent airline. It can
conveniently located gate or share a gate with some other
utilized gate, the incumbent might force it to use a less
entrant rival. For instance, it may charge a very high
use such opportunities to raise the costs of the new
as they sometimes are, tie the use of the gates to a
284not need that service.
contract for ground handling even if the new entrant does
rate for the subleases of unused gate space or if the
sublease prices are controlled by the airport authority,
antitrust action, that is not a very efficacious remedy.
,
/
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Aside from increasing its costs further, it defeats the
purpose of the new entrant: to enter the market quickly.
In addition, the incumbent can make it difficult to prove
that a particular airport slot was in fact under-utilized
and therefore available for use by using a very simple
strategy: using it. Finally, many of the airports are
operated by local government authorities who have long
term agreements with the dominant airline. Airport
leases/licenses may be granted on such locally pertinent
considerations as the ability of the carrier to provide
frequent and sustained service. This complicates matters
further as issues such as state immunity may also arise.
The fact that the carrier concerned may be just a licensee
of the airport authority could also affect the outcome of
the claim because a technical minded court may not
consider such a license as an essential facility over
which the incumbent airline has any property rights which
would enable it to "exclude" anyone from its use.
The apparently "obvious" solution, to increase the
infrastructure available, is also troublesome. Aside from
the perineal shortage of public funds for such purposes,
state and local legislation on matters such as aircraft
sound pollution or airport zoning requirements make such
alternatives unrealistic in the short run.
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5.4 Predatory Conduct
The various developments In the airline industry
after deregulation - the impact of the "economics of
information", the frequent flyer programs and travel agent
incentive schemes, the ability of the airlines to design
complex fare structures with hidden capacity controls, the
evolution of the hub and route systems and the
indispensability of the computerized reservation systems -
has permitted incumbent airlines to indulge in "strategic
conduct" to exclude or oust competitors from the market.
Levine explains such conduct in the following manner.
"The essence of the strategy is simple. Match, or better
yet beat, the new entrant's lowest fares with a low fare
restricted to confine its attractiveness to the leisure-
oriented, price sensitive sector of the market. Match
business-oriented fares and offer extra benefits to
retain the loyalties of travel agents and frequent
flyers. Add frequency where possible, to "sandwich" the
new entrants departures between one's own departures.
Make sure enough seats are available on your flight to
accommodate increases in traffic caused by the fare war.
In short, leave no traveller with either a price or a
schedule incentive to fly with the new entrant ... The
object is to reduce trial and to subject the new entrant
to a prolonged period of operation at low load factors
while inhibiting trials that would disseminate favorable
information about the new entrant. If the new entrant
tries to reduce capacity, it will suffer from reduced
schedule convenience and will reach the indivisibility
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"floor""pf frequency required to maintain presence. If
the new entrant ceases service in the market, its
investment in information, including the information it
generates by actually operating, will largely be lost and
reentry will be almost as expensive as initial
penetration. While some residual familiarity with the
airlines name and service may persist, the public
perception that the airline cannot be relied on to keep
operating - a disadvantage created by the new comer's
attempt to defend itself from these predatory tactics -
could offset the benefits of temporarily ceasing
• 285operat~ons."
No doubt, the incumbent will not operate profitably under
such conditions, especially if it has higher costs than
its new entrant competitor. Its losses will however, be
subsidized by the hub traffic not subject to the new
entrant's price competition, and its information and
principal-agent advantages will tend to keep passengers as
long as there is price parity.:2~ll;
The complex fare structures and computerized capacity
controls of a CRS owning incumbent airline to vary the
number of seats allocated to different fares on a flight
by flight basis. Due to this, the incumbent can always
advertise fares that meet or beat those of the competition
with minor changes to its basic fare structure. By keeping
the number of lowest priced seats offered flexible, the
285 Id., at 476-477.
286 Id.
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incumbent can inundate the market with low priced seats
and withdraw them almost imperceptibly at peak hours or
when competitive conditions allow it to do so without
losing customers.
Such strategic conduct also has the additional
advantage of generating a reputation for fierce
competitive behavior among the airlines' actual or
potential competitors. This reputation of being an
aggressive fighter is not confined to the new entrant
route but extends to the entire industry and acts as a
287deterrent for future challengers.
Although this type of conduct is expensive on any
individual route, the fact that the airline is a
multiproduct firm which operates in several markets and
charges different prices in different market segments,
permits it to spread out its costs over its total
t. 288opera lons.
287 •• h t' dFor a dlScusslon on t e stra eglc an
informational aspects of predation see Williamson ,
Williamson on Predatory Pricing II 88 YALE L. J. 1183,
1184-86 (1979); See also Joskow & Klevonic, A Framework
for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L. J. 213, 231-32
(1979); Schmalensee, Advertising and Entry Deterrence: An
Exploratory Model, 91 J. POL. ECON. 636 (1983).
288 See qenerally, Mark Sievers & Brooks Alberry,
Strategic Allocation of Overhead: The Application of
Traditional Predation Tests to Multiproduct Firms, 60
ANTITRUST L. J., 757 (1992).
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Intuitively, such strategic behavior immediately
suggests predatory conduct. However dealing with it under
the existing state of the law is no simple matter.
Predation claims are normally asserted as a violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits attempts
to monopolize. Attempted monopolization requires proof of
289three elements : 1) specific intent of the defendant to
gain monopoly power; 2) improper conduct by the defendant
directed to gain monopoly power; and 3) likelihood of
success, i.e., a dangerous probability that if the conduct
is left unchecked it would lead to a monopoly of the
market. In addition some courts also require proof of a
relevant market so as to assess the danger of actual
1. t . 290monopo lza lon.
While the requirement of intent has been dispensed
with by some courts~1 and is not likely to be any more
~9 Swift & Company v. united states, 196 U.S. 375,
396 (1905).
290 t .. d t .1 dBu see Lesslg v. Tl ewa er 01 Co., 327 F. 2
459, 474 (9th Cir 1964), rehearinq denied, 327 F 2d 478,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (holding that it is
unnecessary to prove the relevant market in an attempt to
monopolize case.)
291 h .. d .T e courts are dlVlde on how relevant a showlng
of intent is to predation claims. The First, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have held that intent is irrelevant. See
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnel Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232
(1st Cir. 1983); AA poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402-03 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 110 S. ct. 1326 (1990); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d
1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989). The Third, sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that intent is
relevant. See Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
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difficult to prove than in cases of predation in other
industries, the requirements of establishing predatory
conduct, dangerous probability of success and relevant
market is especially troublesome in the context of the
sort of strategic conduct observed in the airline
industry.
The conduct element requires evidence of unfair
competition or activities which are "without legitimate
business purpose" or which "makes sense only because it
eliminates competition" and does not enhance the quality
or attractiveness of the product, reduce its costs or
alter the demand function that all competitors
confront. ,,292 In the case of fare wars in the airline
industry it is extremely difficult to determine whether an
incumbent airline is engaging in the pricing behavior only
to "eliminate competition" or genuinely to meet the
competition.
The discriminatory price structure and the flexible
capacity controls can be explained as legitimate business
practices as they are primarily designed to sell as many
seats on the aircraft as is possible. An airline's
752 F.2d 891 (3d Cir), cert denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985);
Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d
1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036(1984);
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027-28
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.ct. 2110 (1989).
W2 '11' l' dWl lam Ing lS & Sons Co 668 F.2 1014, 1030-31.
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products are similar in some respects to perishable
commodities like agricultural produce. A producer of fresh
vegetables may sell part of his produce at a discounted
price before the crop is ready; he may then sell the same
product at a higher price while it is still fresh;
finally, when the product's shelf life is coming to an
end, he may sell it at a cheaper price so that he does not
end up with a total loss on his remaining stock. An
airline could also offer a similar business justification
for its pricing policy.
Due to the difficulty in identifying a low price
which is "competitive" and therefore legitimate, and one
which is "without legitimate business purpose", Phillip
Areeda and Donald Turner have argued that predatory
pricing should be judged by considering the relationship
293between prices and costs ... They suggest that to
determine whether a firm possessing monopoly power was
engaging in predatory pricing, the court should compare
its prices with its short run marginal costs. If the
prices are higher than or equal to the marginal cost, they
should be presumed. On the other hand, if they are lower
they should be presumed to be predatory. Due to practical
difficulties in estimating the short run marginal costs
293 See Areeda & Turner, Predatory pricing and Related
Practices Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 697 ( 19 7 5) .
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they have suggested that average variable costs may be
used as a proxy.
Though the Areeda-Turner test has its fair share of
critiques,~4 it has been generally recognized as a valid
basis for proceeding in predatory cases and some courts
have explicitly compared prices with average costs to
. 2H5determine their legallty.
The Supreme Court, in Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio corp2Hfiseems to have accepted this
analysis by observing that a firm engaging in predatory
pricing necessarily incurs losses. It then goes even
further and states that a firm would indulge in such
pricing only if it had a reasonable expectation of
2H7recouping its profits in the future.' Arguably, the
294See e.g., Liebler, Whither Predatory pricinq ?
From Areeda-Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1052 (1986); Hay, The Economics of Predatory pricinq, 51
ANTITRUST L. J. 361 (1982) i Brodley & Hay, Predatory
pricing: Competinq Economic Theories and the Evolution of
Leqal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981).
295 See e.q., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F.
Supp. 965, 989-91 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
296 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
297 Id., at 588-589. ( lithe success of such (predatory)
schemes is uncertain: the short run loss is definite, but
the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the
competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve
monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry
by new competitors eager to share in the excess profits.
The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the
predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain ...
For this reason, there is a consensus among commentators
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result of this decision would be to require the plaintiff
to show that not only has the defendant priced below
average cost but it also has a reasonable expectation of
recouping its losses in the future.
Neither the Areeda-Turner test, nor the Matsushita
test, is very helpful for dealing with the kind of
strategic pricing observed in the airline industry.
Firstly, there is the difficulty of determining the
"marginal cost" of the airline. Does it mean the cost of
filling an additional seat? If it does, then the marginal
cost is probably nothing. Once the flight has been
scheduled it costs more or less the same whether it
carries only one passenger or carries a plane load.
The determination of "average cost" also has its
difficulties. Is the average to be computed by dividing
the cost of operating a flight by the total number of
seats, or are all flights to be taken into account? Would
it be necessary for the airline to cover the costs of each
flight solely from the fares realized from the passengers
travelling on it ? Or would the average costs of all
flights on the route be the correct figure ? The airline
may also convincingly argue that what is really relevant
is its costs spread over its entire network and not just
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successfully.")
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on the individual routes on which it faces competition
from the plaintiff.
The second problem would be to define the relevant
price. with the great diversity of prices in vogue that
would be a formidable problem. Average price could, of
course, be considered but that would not be too helpful.
Even if the average price was found to be below the
airlines' average cost, the airline could quite
conceivably offer a procompetitive justification for it.
Since an airline has to maintain its flight schedules
irrespective of the number of seats booked, it could claim
that it was compelled to sell its tickets at lower than
"average" costs so as to at least earn some revenue from a
committed flight. Such an argument could well pass the
test of "legitimate business purpose." In any case, an
inquiry about whether on a particular day the airline did
not have enough passengers willing to travel at a fare
higher than the one offered would be quite impossible.
Finally, using the pricing strategy described above
might not even entail pricing below cost. The traditional
legal and economic notions about predatory pricing are
based on the simplistic assumption that the dominant firm
faces effective competition in all markets and market
segments. As discussed above, the airline can generate
sufficient revenue to not incur losses by appropriately
pricing the less price elastic segments of its markets. At
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the same time, it can match or even beat the new entrants
prices in the more price sensitive segments of the market
and force the new entrant to suffer losses in spite of its
298lower cost structure.
Determining the relevant market and proving
possession of market power, would also be problematic.
Since airlines operate in numerous markets, and services
are constantly changing, the defendant may well insist on
a broader definition of the market.An additional hurdle
which a plaintiff would have to cross in a civil antitrust
case is the need to demonstrate antitrust injury.2~ The
Ninth circuit in a recent case has held that
anticompetitive intent, even if shown, did not relieve the
plaintiff from showing its losses were the result of the
alleged predatory conduct of the major airline and not
b . h . d t .t . 300caused y any thlng ot er than lncrease compe 1 lone
In view of these problems it is not surprising that very
few cases involving predatory pricing have reached court.
298 • 1b . l'See Slevers & A ery, supra note 288. An alr lne
can be charecterized as a multiproduct firm because of its
ability to segment its markets.
~9 Antitrust injuries are injuries flowing from the
defendant's anticompetitive acts and are not losses
resulting from the increase in competition in the market.
The plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct
was intended to or actually did have an anticompetitive
effect beyond the plaintiff's own loss of business or the
market's loss of a competitor. Brunswick Corp. V. Pueblo
Bowl-Q-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
300 Pacific Express Inc. v. united Airlines Inc.,
1992-1 CCH Trade Cas. Par. 69,770.
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Aside from the difficulty in establishing a claim of
predatory pricing, a very relevant consideration is the
efficacy of the relief. Antitrust suits are notoriously
expensive. Before a small airline embarks on the highly
uncertain venture of filing suit, it must evaluate the
utility of the same. The normal relief granted by a court,
after a long and protracted procedure is the grant of an
injunction against future conduct. The delay might mean
that the airline goes out of business in the meanwhile.
Moreover, there is no device to ensure that similar
practices will not be indulged in spite of the injunction.
Enforcing the order may mean going back to court and
repeating the whole process once again. Action by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice may
relieve a new entrant of the additional burden of
financing a law suit, due to the problems of proving such
claims as well as factors discussed below, the Antitrust
Division has been unable to do much about such practices.
5.5 Reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Antitrust
Machinerv
The inability of the Antitrust Division to dispel the
antitrust concerns caused by the above developments can be
pinned down to several reasons.
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5. (5)(i) Shortcoming of existinq tests
The Department's inability to effectively deal with
the antitrust issues can be partly attributed to the
shortcomings of the present tests to determine whether
enforcement action is necessary. When the antitrust
oversight of the airline industry was transferred to the
Justice Department, the airlines were to be treated as
"any other industry" in the matter of antitrust
enforcement. Unl ike the DOT's "functional ,,301 approach
the Department of Justice places more emphasis on market
share analysis embodied in its Merger Guidelines.
Unfortunately, such an analysis becomes quite
problematic when applied to the airline industry. First,
there is the difficulty of defining a relevant market.
Airlines compete in several geographical and product
markets. Geographically they may compete for traffic on
international routes, at a national level, at a regional
level, over different hubs, between two cities, and
finally, between two airports. On every route airlines may
also compete for different airline "products" like economy
or business class, morning or evening flights, peak or non
peak time flights, or direct or connecting flights. To
complicate matters further, the variety of "products"
change almost daily. Finally, the continued existence of
potential or existing competitors in a particular market
301 See su~ra note 259 and accompanying text.
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result even cases in other industries where
power in the narrower markets.
The Policy of Minimal Enforcement
is also uncertain. In such a situation the natural
tendency is to consider the broader markets as the
relevant market and ignore apparent instances of monopoly
The "policy of minimal enforcement,,302adopted by
existence of market power are difficult to apply. One of
the major indices of market power employed by enforcement
Second, conventional tests for ascertaining the
agencies and courts is the degree of price discretion a
5.5(ii)
meaningful way.
Third, the incorrect belief that the airline markets
to indulge in discriminatory pricing, and the development
firm enjoys in the market. But the ability of all airlines
makes it virtually impossible to use such a test in any
of the computerized system of hidden capacity controls,
policy makers for the most of the eighties, also affected
302See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100
Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 818-821. (1987).
were highly contestable shared by most economists and
the Departments assessment of the competitive effects of
transactions scrutinized by it.
the Reagan Administration has continued without
significant change under the Bush Administration. As a
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anticompetitive effects were more apparent and the market
and industry practices were more amenable to standard
merger analysis were left alone by the Department. A large
number of jUdicial appointments during the Reagan
Presidency were from the ranks of Chicago economists.
Their well known preference for relying on the market
rather than on the Antitrust Division for protecting
competition may have also influenced the Department to
conserve its limited resources for cases in which it would
be easier to present evidence.
5.5(iii) Leqacv of the DOT's permissive Reqime
In spite of the Justice Department's objections, the
Department of Transportation had permitted several major
consolidations. The airline industry was already
considerably consolidated by the time the Justice
Department was seized of the matter. The mass scale merger
activities of the early eighty's was no longer there,
leaving the Department little scope to take much action.
Similarly, the number of new entrants declined
dramatically by the end of the eighties, reducing the need
to check other types of exclusionary behavior.
5.5(iv) Exit Throuqh Bankruptcv
A serious handicap that the Department faces after
the transfer of antitrust scrutiny authority to it is that
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further consolidations and concentrations have been
through the mechanism of bankruptcy over which the
antitrust laws have no control. The Justice Department has
been a helpless bystander while the less fortunate
carriers have disintegrated in bankruptcy court. The only
buyers interested in the assets of these defunct airlines
are the handful of still solvent airlines who are
dominating the u.s. skies.
While the Department has been appearing in these
bankruptcy proceedings and trying to see that further
acquisitions by the airlines has the least anticompetitive
effect, its options are limited. In a bankruptcy
proceeding the final consideration is the interests of the
creditors though the bankruptcy judge can and does take
into account the views of the Antitrust Division. In that
situation, the availability of an alternative suitor for
the bankrupt airline's assets with a realistic offer
becomes very important. 303 The Bankruptcy Code provides
that when disposition of the debtor's assets requires
303 For example in a recent case before the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York, the
Bankruptcy Court could accommodate the views of the
Antitrust Division that a sale of Eastern Airlines' assets
should be sold to Northwest Airlines, the second highest
bidder, as that would be more competitive because, firstly
there was a second bidder, and secondly Northwest
increased its bid to match that of united Airlines, the
highest bidder. See 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1486, at 541; Helene D. Jaffe, Developments in Merger
Law and Enforcement in 1990-91, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 667, 672
(1992) .
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Hart-Scott-Rodino notification the required period shall
end on the tenth day after receipt of the filing unless
the court, after notice and hearing, orders otherwise.304
This means that the enforcement agency also has to act
very fast and satisfy the Bankruptcy Court about its
claim.
5.6 Attempts to Increase Competitiveness in the Airline
Industry
Contrary to the public impression, the Antitrust
Division has not been entirely passive regarding the ills
of the airline industry. In spite of its constraints, it
has successfully averted the merger of the computer
systems owned by American Airlines and Delta Airlines, the
sale of Eastern's gates and slots at National Airport to
united Airlines, the acquisitions by American Airlines of
all Trans World Airlines routes between London and the
united states, and Eastern's sale of its assets at the
Philadelphia airport to USAir.~5
304 11 U.S.C, § 363 (b)(2).
305 Robert D. Willig, Antitrust Lessons from the
Airline Industrv: The DOJ Experience, 60 ANTITRUST L. J.
695, 697 (referring to The Aqenda for Antitrust:
Developments at the Department of Justice, Remarks of
James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, u.s. Department of Justice, 25th Annual New
England Antitrust Conference, Cambridge, Mass. (Oct 25,
1991) •
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The Antitrust Division has also initiated
investigations involving the alleged restrictive practices
of hub carriers with respect to airport expansion, alleged
misuse of CRS's and the effect of excessively concentrated
hubs.306 In addition, the Division has been urging the
DOT to make it easier for foreign carriers to enter the
u.s. markets so that there could be more intense
307competition in these markets. However, due to the
prevailing atmosphere of protectionism, these efforts are
unlikely to be fruitful unless Congress steps in or the
next Administration is more committed to ensuring
competitiveness in the industry.
Though the developments in the deregulated airline
industry has disappointed many of its supporters, not all
the results of deregulating the industry have been
negative. The next chapter will briefly discuss some of
these gains of deregulation. It will then broadly consider
the policy implications of the deregulation experience.
306 Id., at 696.
307 Id.
CHAPTER 6
ASSESSMENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The above discussion about the outcome of
deregulation shows that several key assumptions regarding
the behavior of the deregulated market has been proved
wrong by actual developments. Serious doubt has been cast
on others. At the same time antitrust enforcement, airline
bankruptcies and debt, and airline safety, have become
subjects of considerable concern. However, these
developments have often obscured the positive results of
deregulation. Before discussing the policy implications of
the deregulation experience it is necessary to note these
beneficial consequences of deregulating the industry.
This chapter will briefly mention these gains of
deregulation and assess the over all impact of
deregulation. In the light of this assessment, a few
observations will be made about the implications of the
deregulation experience for future policy in the U.S.A.
6.1 The Gains of Deregulation
Deregulation has brought about significant
improvements in certain aspects of airline operations. For
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one, airline efficiency has gone up and costs have gone
'down.~8 In spite of their complexity, fares today appear
to be much lower on an average than what they would have
been had the pricing system under CAB not been
discontinued.309 They certainly are far below those in
other developed countries. 310 Finally, though there has
b 1 f . t 11 .t . 311 deen oss 0 serVlce 0 some sma er communl les , an
air travel no longer offers the comfort it used to in the
308 See e.g., DAVID SAWYERS, COMPETITION IN THE AIR, WHAT
EUROPE CAN LEARN FROM THE U.S.A. 17-23 (1987); Donald
Pickerel, The Regulation and Derequlation of U.S.
Airlines, in AIRLINE DEREGULATION - INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCES 25-27 (Kenneth Button Ed.) (1991).
~9 Econometric estimates of fare reduction vary but
on the whole they seem to have reduced. See e.q.,
Pickrell, supra note 308, at 29 (estimating that on an
average fares are around 15% lower); Morrisson & Winston,
The Dvnamics of Airline Pricinq and Com?etition, Paper
presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Economics
Association, Atlanta, U.S.A. (December 1989) ( On an
average fares 18% lower during 1977-86 and 13-15% lower
subsequently); See also, BAILEY supra note 15, at 60-66;
MORRISSON & WINSTON, supra note 15, at 19-36; SAWYERS, su?ra
note 308, at 27; Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its
Effects on Passenqer Capital and Labor, 29 J. L. & ECON 6,
8-9 (1986).
310 See SAWYERS supra note 213, at 55 (fares of
European airlines for comparable distances and markets are
almost double those of U.S. airlines; with some exceptions
European airlines also offer less discounted fares.);
Recent newspaper reports suggest that this trend has
continued and U.S. domestic fares are much less than those
in Europe. See e.g., Euro?e Apt to see Merqer of its
Airlines, page 3, Column 1, Los Angeles Times, March 15,
1992.
311 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of
Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities, 39 ADM L.
R. 445; Stephenson & Beir, The Effects of Airline
Derequlation on Air Service to Small Communities, 20
TRANSP. L. J. 54, 57 (1981) .
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hey days of the CAB, airline customers do have a much
wider choice of destinations and schedules than would have
been possible before deregulation312• Today, thanks to
the hub and spoke system, virtually every airport has
daily connections to every other airport in the country
with one, or at most two, stop overs.
The lower fares and vastly expanded network of
services, in turn, has generated and sustained much larger
amounts of air travel with the consequential gains of
increased earnings and employment in the travel and
tourism industry, and increased economic development of
regions surrounding new hubs and major spokes.
Interestingly, though the deregulated market has
substantially conformed to the predictions of the
proponents of deregulation regarding improvements in
airline efficiency, lower costs and fares, and consumer
responsive routing and scheduling313, the market has
achieved this in ways not anticipated by them: primarily
through the hub and spoke system.
However, the problems which have arisen after
deregulation have clouded these improvements. views differ
312 See S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT IN A
COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN MARKET 87-89 (1986); Hawk, supra note
248, at 271.
3M Welfare gains to travelers from fare reductions
and service improvements are estimated at six billion
dollars per year. Service is also better suited to
consumer needs. See MORRISSON & WINSTON, supra note 15 at 2,
24-52, 57-59.
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about the gravity of these problems as also the "proper"
way of dealing with them. While the limitations and
inadequacies of the present regulatory structure to deal
with these problems is generally recognized, the nature of
reform or action required is still not clear. The
economists and academicians who were so confident about
their understanding of the industry before deregulation
. t 314 • f th . tare more clrcumspec now . In Vlew 0 elr recen
rebuff by the market, their reluctance to make sweeping or
bold recommendations about policy is understandable.
6.2 The Futile Public Debate about the Relative Merits of
"Derequlation" and "Rerequlation"
But that has not stopped the issue from being
discussed in the public media or on political platforms.
Unfortunately, such public discussions are not always the
most well informed or objective, and public policy
emerging only from that is not likely to be the best. Just
as public and media obsession with the wonderfully low
prices which immediately followed deregulation had
distracted attention from the negative developments
discussed in the last two chapters, so also the feeling of
frustration with the inability of the present system to
314 •• l' 1 t' t .See Levlne, Alr lne Derequ a lon: A Perspec lve,
60 ANTITRUST L. J. 687, 694 (1992) ("there is a set of
relationships here that are simply more complicated than
the ones we thought we understood fifteen years ago.)
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tackle the industry's current problems has made several
observers loose sight of the gains of deregulation.
Another unfortunate aspect of such discussions is
that the imperfections of the CAB era are normally
overlooked and the artificial stability and simplicity of
the regulated regime are glorified. Not to be outdone,
hardline market enthusiasts have blamed the industry's
ills to the fact that deregulation was not complete. Had
the airports not been left out of the free market, they
claim, the market would have found a solution for the
industry's bottle-necks. The proponents of reregulation
counter this by pointing out that it was this free market
which led to the dire financial condition of the industry
in the first place. Both camps, of course, implicitly
assume that their respective vehicles for salvaging the
industry would behave perfectly and in accordance with
text book precision.
Public policy discussions, therefore, have
degenerated into a futile debate about the merits and
demerits of "deregulation" vis a vis those of
"reregulation", in a manner suggesting that these are the
only two options available. 315 Public memory being
notoriously short, most people have forgotten about the
shortcomings of the CAB regime. To allay the fears of
315 tl th' . I d t th f' tPar y, 1S 1S a so ue 0 e con uS1ng na ure
of the two expressions.
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those who still remember, the proponents of reregulation
hint at "partial reregulation", thereby referring to some
undefined mix of free market operations and price, route
or capacity controls.
However, debating on the relative merits of a perfect
regulatory system and a perfect market is meaningless. No
one would seriously dispute the proposition that
regulation, when perfect, would produce better results
than an imperfect market place. Likewise, few would doubt
that perfect markets are superior to imperfect regulatory
regimes. However, in practice niether the market nor the
regulator is perfect.
6.3 The Challenge of the Nineties
A better line of inquiry is to ask three basic
questions. First, what are the lessons one has learnt from
the experience of the last decade or so. This has to be an
objective assessment of the nature of airline markets and
airline competition, divorced from the question of what
type of regulatory structure is needed.
Second, what do we mean by "the public interest" in
the context of the airline industry, i.e., what kind of an
airline industry would we like to have.
Third, in view of these "lessons" of deregulation,
and this understanding of the kind of industry which would
serve the best interests of the public, what kind of a
136
regulatory structure seems more capable of delivering the
goods.
Answering these questions in a meaningful manner is
the challenge which the regulators, policy makers and
academicians have to meet. For that they would have to
immerse themselves into the the reality of the airline
business. Abstract models and simplified assumptions about
the nature of airline competition are no doubt helpful in
analyzing the performance of the industry. But it must be
recognized that their purpose is to help explain reality,
not cover it up.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to try
suggest the "correct solutions" to the industry's present
woes, some light is intended to be shed on how these
realities of the airline business have to be taken into
consideration by policy makers.
6.4 The Lessons of the Derequlation Experience
The last decade has substantially altered both the
perception and the reality of airline competition. Today
it is widely acknowledged that the economies of the hub
and spoke systems makes them the most efficient means of
organizing air transport. The complexity of the price
system and the importance of the CRS is also widely
accepted as an inevitable consequence of removing
regulatory controls. Moreover, it is no longer disputed
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that for effective competition the rival airlines must be
and seasonal swings in business. The implication of this
Effective Competition Requires Competitors of
Comparable strenqth.
6.4(1)
more competitive they must be able to attract competitors
is simple, if the policy makers want to make the industry
316 This in itself is not a very startling finding.
Conventional wisdom and traditional legal analysis has
always recognized that a "fair" fight requires rivals of
comparable stature and ability.
viable hub, and sufficient funds to tide over price wars
industry it is necessary to have a well recognized brand
in the wake of deregulation shows that for survival in the
The first lesson from the deregulation experience is
of comparable size and strength. The liquidation of
virtually all of the airlines which entered the industry
name, an extensive route system, an adequate presence at a
who can enter the industry in as large a scale as the
. b t 316lncum en s.
by a small new airline virtually impossible. What, then,
policy alternatives it is necessary to answer this
of airline competition ? In order to meaningfully consider
has these and other observations about the functioning of
question.
that the entry barriers inherent in the system make entry
the industry after deregulation tought us about the nature
Does that require any policy initiative ? That would
failure. If the failure is to be attributed to
strategies, as well as those who allowed themselves to
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Need to Discouraqe "Pernicious" Manaqement
Practices
6.4(2)
intentional bleeding of healthy companies by corporate
incompetence. However, if part of the problem seems due to
is not the function of the government to nurse and protect
judgement probably no action is called for. After all it
depend on our ability to identify the causation of this
are essential for survival, they apparently are not
become overburdened with highly leveraged debts, have also
sunk with the new entrants.317
well thought routes and products, effective marketting
sufficient. Established carriers which could not develop
Braniff and Eastern has shown that while these conditions
Second, the fate of former giants like Pan American,
unimaginative competitive strategies or bad business
what we may label "pernicious" practices such as the
take over artists not interested in running the airlines
317 For a description of the different corporate
strategiesof the 10 largest CAB certificated airlines and
an analysis of why only four, American, United, Delta and
Northwest were successful see Byrnes supra note 73. Since
then Northwest has also fallen into serious financial
trouble due to a massive billion dollar leveraged buyout
debt. See And Then There Were? Fare Wars, Law Suits give
Rise to Fears that Industry may become Oligopoly, Star
Tribune, col. 6, p. 10, June 26, 1992.
)
/
6.4(3)
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as a business enterprise, a policy response appears
appropriate.
The question still remains of course as to how these
pernicious activities will be checked. Should every
takeover bid be submitted to a regulatory agency which
will use its own (non business) judgement to decide
whether the takeover is likely to have an adverse impact
on the health of the corporation ? Should we simply ban
such take overs ? Or can we device some method by which
individual decision making is preserved but confined
within a broad range of safety based on scientifically
observed data, not abstract theory ? Present discussions
seem to confine themselves to the first two options. There
certainly is a need to explore the third possibility.
Atomistic Competition Precluded due to
Indivisibilities
The third lesson from the deregulation experience is
that atomistic competition is precluded due to the
indivisibilities in the industry. Any attempt to increase
or maintain the competitive level of the industry must
address the question of the viability of hubs and the role
of indivisibilities in the industry. Hubs are close to
natural monopolies as many of the spokes are too thin too
support a second carrier. As a result, only one airline is
likely to enjoy the comprehensive traffic feed necessary
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for its own hub.
for any of them or for their customers.
Effective Competition in a Hub6.4(4)
i.e., if the carriers do not have to depend on feed
network effects are unimportant on a particular route,
in such hubs? The answer to this question is crucial to
for competitive survival. 318 Artificially keeping more
than one carrier in such hubs is unlikely to be beneficial
Does that mean that there is no scope for competition
determine the nature of regulation required. An empirical
stud/19 of non-stop city pair routes suggests that if
network effects are important on a route, the scope of
traffic, all existing carriers act as effective
competitors and thus discipline prices. If, however,
competing airlines entering that city-pair market is
constrained by their ability to capture sufficient feed
traffic. In practical terms this means that effective
competition in a hub dominated by one airline can be
offered only by an airline which uses that hub as a spoke
318 See supra note 142 and accompanying text;
Kahn(1992), supra note 241, at 863; Levine(1987), supra
note 14, at 444-445.
319 Hurdle, Johnson, Joskow, Werden & Williams,
Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the
Airline Industrv, 38 J. INDUS. EeoN. 38 (1989).
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Since the total number of possible hubs is limited by
a country's size and population, it follows that the
number of airlines that the traffic of any country will
support is limited. The policy implications of this are
two fold. First, a device has to be found to encourage and
enable airlines having different hubs to operate spokes in
each others hubs and spokes. Second, it has to be ensured
that a sufficient number of airlines with viable hub and
spoke systems remain on the landscape to put sufficient
competitive pressure on the market participants. A
secondary, but important, aspect of this policy measure is
the need to ensure that there is no collusion between the
limited number of market participants.
To come out with a viable policy one must look at the
problem like a participant. For competition is real only
when it is perceived as a threat by the actual incumbents
of the market place. A promising, but politically
volatile, method may be to permit major foreign airlines
to operate on selected domestic routes.
6.4(6) Problem of Airport Access
However, efforts to woo competitors of strength are
not likely to be successful unless the problem of access
to airport facilities is solved. Relying on the free
market or on the local authorities to solve this problem
is unrealistic. The problem can be tackled only at the
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federal level. That does not mean that the federal
government will have to administratively determine whom to
allot these facilities. A market based system can be
devised in which all airlines can bid for the scarce
resources. However a cap may be fixed to limit any single
airline from controlling more than a maximum number of
slots or gates. The period for which these facilities
would be leased could also be limited. Of course before
recommending any measure, its likely impact on the
incentive structure of the airlines as well as on the
likely repurcussions on consumers has to be considered.
The move may also meet political hurdles as the major
airlines are bound to lobby against it. But merely because
this alternative has difficulties does not mean it should
not be considered.
6.4(7) Requlatinq the CRS Industry
Finally, while the indispensability of the CRS
Industry to the airline industry is undeniable, an
effective solution is required to minimize or remove the
potential of misuse of the CRS technology by their owners.
The most important drawbacks of these technological
wonders in the present industry set up is that they enable
their airline owners to get real-time information on their
competitors' business patterns.
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There can be several ways of dealing with this
problem.
(a) Divesture
First, the link between the CRS and the airline owner
can be severed. Divesture, however would not remove the
possibility of the new CRS owner selling the same program
and information to the highest bidder, especially if the
new CRS owner can enter into exclusive agreements with the
purchaser. Divesture, therefore must be coupled with a
safeguard against such exclusive dealings. While the
general antitrust laws may well be employed to curb such
anticompetitive dealings by the new owner, it would be
preferable, in view of the "selective" enforcement of the
antitrust laws by the concerned admininistrative agencies
in the past, to specifically prohibit such anticompetitive
dealings.
(b) Merqer of all CRS to form a Public utility
A second alternative could be to merge all of the
different CRS's to form one universal reservation system
and regulating the CRS industry like a public utility.
That way all airlines could get equal access to the
informational advantages of the CRS on the same terms.
That would also permit realization of the considerable
economies of scale and scope which the CRS industry
enjoys.
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The implications of an oligopolistic airline industry
possessing perfect market intelligence, however, needs to
examined very carefully. One may ask, in this context,
whether there is any significant benefit in keeping the
airlines in the dark about their rivals' business
activities or requiring them to rely on less efficient
means of of getting such market intelligence. The
objection to an airline owner of a CRS using such
information is not on account of any inherent
undesirability of the same but rather on account of the
perceived "unfairness" of this method of competition due
to the exclusion of the non-owner competitors from access
to the same information. Surely, it may be argued, if all
competitors have equal access to such real time knowledge
there is no inequity in the situation.
The danger, however, in such a situation of "perfect
knowledge" is the possibility of the airlines indulging in
collusive route and price strategies through tacit price
fixing and capacity sharing. Although such activity would
be illegal under the antitrust laws, the problem of
proving collusion in these circumstances would probably be
impossible.
(c) Mandatory Disclosure by Travel Aqents
A third option which is worth considering is to make
certain disclosures mandatory for the travel agent. For
example a travel agent may be asked to disclose to the
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customer which airline CRS is being used. The customer can
then search out a travel agent who operates another CRS
and compare the services offered by them. Such mandatory
disclosure requirements need not be an alternative to a
scheme for divesture of the CRS Industry but may be used
in conjunction with it.
6.5 The "Public Interest"
Before translating the policy implications of the
deregulation experience into specific policy proposals it
is important to define with reasonable clarity what the
proposals should be desiged to achieve. No doubt the
ultimate aim of any policy prescription should be to
achieve what is in the public interest. But what is meant
by the "public interest" in the context of the airline
industry?
This a particularly important and vexed question
which is often side-tracked in academic discussions. Take
the case of airline bankruptcies. Why should the
bankruptcy of an airline be of any special significance?
How or why does it attract more concern than the
liquidation of another business concern ? Is it because it
signifies the end of an era of extremely low fares
(Peoples Express), or because it means the end of a part
of history (Pan American), or because it displays that
even the largest of airlines cannot withstand the
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combination of poor management and leveraged debt
(Eastern) ?
Or consider the issue of "discriminatory pricing". No
doubt, the complexity of the price structure after
deregulation has made it impossible for a lay person to
find out whether she is getting the best deal. But it has
also enabled many persons, who would have been otherwise
unable to afford air travel, to fly on deep discount
tickets. Would simple and uniform fare structures serve
the public interest better merely because full fare
travellers would have to pay less ? Should frequent flyer
programs be discontinued just because it encourages
corporate travellers to fly on higher priced tickets ?
Should airlines be forced to discontinue with frequent
flyer programs ?
These questions cannot be answered easily. They also
reveal that the answer may well be different depending on
whom we consider to be a representative member of the all
encompassing expression "public". However, it must be kept
in mind that air transportation, ultimately, is a public
necessity.320 The social utility of having a well
developed, healthy and consumer responsive air
transportation system far exceeds what is reflected by the
320The expression "public utility" is not used to
avoid introducing into the discussion the special
connototions that expression has for economists and public
policy practitioners.
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private profits of the airlines providing such service.
Nor does the costs incurred by the airlines fully reveal
the societal expenditure on building up and maintaining
the infrastructure for such services. Participants in the
industry, therefore, have a greater public responsibility
than do the participants in most other industries and
consumers have a right to expect that airline managements
will run their businesses with greater restraint than
would be tolerated in less socially significant
businesses.
However, aside from recognizing the necessity of more
onerous responsibilities in respect of safety due to the
"hazardous" nature of the business, commentators have
generally ignored the "social" obligation of airlines to
ensure that their business activities does not jeopardize
the very existence of the air transportation system.
To ensure this, some form of mandatory disclosure
requirements coupled with statutory guidelines regarding
acceptable levels of debts and liquidity for operating an
airline, sources of financing for takeovers or
acquisitions of airlines, and acceptable types of intra-
company transfers of assets between airlines and their
subsidiaries or holding corporations may be in order. The
object of such statutory scrutiny would be to prevent an
airline management from embarking on a perilous adventure
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at the expense of the consumers of air transport, the
airline's creditors and its shareholders.
Regarding the question of discriminatory pricing by
airlines, the wide range of prices appear to be an
inevitable consequence of different price elasticities in
321different segments of the airline market. However, the
general practice of most airlines of making "discounted"
tickets both nontransferable and nonrefundable is not
justifiable and does cause hardship to consumers. A
statutory provision prohibiting airlines from making such
tickets both nontransferable and nonrefundable should
effectively deal with this problem.
Finally, as far as frequent flyer programs are
concerned, the extreme popularity of these programs
suggests that consumers do perceive them as highly
desirable. The fact that it encourages business travellers
to buy more expensive business class and first class
tickets is no ground for discontinuing these programs. If
a corporation or its shareholders are really bothered by
this it is open for them to take appropriate action to
stop their corporate employee from travelling on the more
expensive tickets. Moreover, there seems no social benefit
of forcing the airlines to stop selling cheaper tickets to
the general public so that it could sell less expensive
~1 See supra Chapter 5.
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tickets to a class of persons who does not seem to mind or
care that they pay more than the general public.
Since air transportation cannot become the alcove of
just a small section of society, whatever regu~atory
machinery and methods are chosen should be able to judge,
weigh and balance the competing needs of different
sections of the society. This brings us to the third basic
question: who or what is to perform this task?
6.6 The Choice of Requlatorv Structure
If one hears the debate raging through the industry
circles or in the pages of the popular press one gets the
impression that the only policy choices available are the
present form of "deregulation" or a CAB type
"reregulation". However, niether are these the only policy
alternatives available nor do either of them seem capable
of solving the current problems of the industry.
6.6(1) Rerequlation not warranted
We have already seen that "deregulation" has not been
able prevent the problems of the industry from developing.
On the contrary, it has created conditions which have
allowed such problems to develop by not anticipating
certain charecteristics of airline markets.
But does that mean a return to a regulatory structure
based on that established by the civil Aeronautics Act is
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necessary or even desirable? Or, to put it differently,
is it reasonable to expect a new regulatory agency to sort
out the problems of the industry in a manner which would
be in the best interests of the public ?
In view of our experience with the various attempts
to directly regulate business in the past, both in this
country and abroad, one would be inclined to say no. Even
assuming that the (hopefully better) understanding of
airline markets and competition during the last decade
would enable such a regulatory agency to act in an
informed manner, it is extremely doubtful that it would be
able to function in a more efficient or socially relevant
manner than its predecessor.
The history of the airline industry has shown how
poorly our regulators had understood the needs of the
transportation system. within less than two years of
relaxing their hold on the industry, the entire map of
domestic air transport had changed. The market simply made
a mockery of forty years of "studies and research" based
on assumptions of linear routes, direct flights and
uniform prices, assumptions which were shared by both
proponents and opponents of deregulation. Only the most
naive of persons would believe that with this "new found
knowledge" of the nature of airline competition, a present
day CAB would be the answer to all of the industry's woe.
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Moreover, in view of the political necessity of
appeasing the considerable strong "free market lobby" in
the country, there is no guarantee that the nature or
extent of authority granted to a modern day CAB would be
adequate. However, it is almost certain that any kind of
regulatory regime which tries to directly control an
economic activity, by substituting its judgement for the
judgement of the marketplace, even an imperfect one, leads
to inefficiencies and is socially wasteful.
Aside from its high costs, direct regulation suffers
from two great disadvantages. First, it restricts the
choice of the market participants and substitutes its own
set of values and preferences on the public. Second, such
a regulatory set up has no effective means of receiving
feedback about whether the system is adequately responding
to public demands and preferences.
6.6(2) Need for employinq indirect. non intrusive forms
of regulation
Does that mean then that nothing should be done by
the government, that we would just have to live with
things as they are and hope that in some magical way the
market will reform itself and the problems will be swept
away ? One should hope not. Once we give up the stereo
type characterization of markets as "contestable" or
"competitive" and look at them simply as "markets" which
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need some help from the government, we might be in a
better position to deal with the problems.
What is required now is to end the futile debate
about whether to go back to a regulated era or to continue
with the deregulation experiment, and focus instead on the
possibilities of employing the various other non intrusive
forms of policy instruments available to a government to
help the market. The market may not be the "best"
alternative. But in this imperfect world it is the one
which is likely to prove the most responsive to the needs
of the general public. A regulatory agency, however well
informed, can only second guess what the public needs.
If the market fails to respond adequately to such
needs, the solution is not necessarily the removal of
individual choice of the market participants and
substitute that with the dictates of a regulatory agency.
A more sensible course is to try to influence the choice
of the market participants rather than take away the
choice altogether.
with this in mind, and in view of the above
observations and analysis of airline competition and the
problems facing the industry, a few suggestions are made
regarding some regulatory measures which could be tried
instead of resorting to reregulation or plain inaction. In
keeping with the nature of industry and the issues
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involved the proposed actions would have to be implemented
at the Federal level.
6.7 Proposed Requlatorv Measures
A. SETTING UP OF AN ADVISORY BODY.
(a) Constitution and Procedure
A statutory body may be set up consisting of airline
industry experts, academicians, management experts,
lawyers and elected representatives of the public for the
commission and study of various aspects of airline
operations in the country. Representatives of airlines,
consumer groups and other interested persons would be able
to submit their views on subjects being studied by the
Advisory Body though there would be no right of a personal
hearing.
In its functioning the Advisory Body will have the
responsibility of properly considering all material before
it but its proceedings will not be in the nature of an
administrative hearing and there will be no lengthy "due
process" requirements.
(b) Functions
The Advisory Body would:
1. Identify the principal hubs in the country and the
number of airlines each of these hubs could
reasonably support. It would also report on the
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actual presence of airlines in such hubs and
instances where a single airline had access to more
than 50% of the landing slots.
2. Identify suitable indices to measure the, economic
health of airlines and periodically review the
performance of individual airlines in this behalf.
3. Issue guidelines for lending institutions,
shareholders and creditors regarding acceptable or
safe limits of debt/liquidity ratios, debt/asset
ratios and other such financial indices, keeping in
view the special needs of the airline industry.
4. Identify those airports which are suffering from
chronic congestion and suggest alternative airport
sites which could be developed to relieve such
congestion. Also suggest types of tax or other
indirect incentives which might be given to encourage
use of such alternative airports.
5. Identify underutilized airports and suggest means of
utilizing them more efficiently.
6. study trends in air traffic growth and project future
needs of infrastructure, airports and aircrafts.
The object of such an Advisory Body would be three
fold. First, as a result of such continual scrutiny of the
industry both the airlines and the government would be
able to react promptly to the needs of the public and the
market. Second, the enhanced public exposure of airline
155
management functioning and the availability of the
guidelines and economic health indices would discourage
speculative and pernicios management practices of the kind
mentioned above. Third, the proposals of the Advisory
Board regarding statutory incentives and disincentives for
inducing desirable conduct would be available to the
government on a continuing basis and the government would
also get very important feedback of the results of the
statutory provisions.
B. DIVESTURE OF THE CRS INDUSTRY.
C. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
Suitable statutory provisions may be enacted to
impose mandatory disclosure requirements:
1. For airline management regarding the effect of major
management decisions on the indices of airline health
identified by the Advisory Body.
2. For travel agents regarding ownership of CRS used by
them.
3. For persons contemplating takeovers and acquisitions
of airlines regarding the source of their finances
and, if financed through debt, the terms of such debt
and the proposed manner of repaying the same.
4. For airlines and CRS owners regarding agreements with
other airlines or CRS owners.
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D. PROHIBIT SALE OF NONTRANSFERABLE AND NONREFUNDABLE
TICKETS.
A statutory provision prohibiting the selling of
tickets which are both nontransferable an~ nonrefundable
may be enacted. If a ticket is charecterized as
nontransferable, the airline must agree to refund the fare
in case of a cancellation. If the ticket is nonrefundable
the passenger must be permitted to transfer it.
E. PROVISIONS REGARDING AIRPORT ACCESS.
suitable statutory provisions may be made for:
1. Ensuring that not more than 50% of the landing slots
available at an airport is used by one airline.
2. Fixing higher rates of landing charges for more
congested airports than those fixed for less
congested airports.
3. Fixing higher rates of landing charges for flights
landing during peak traffic hours as compared to
those for off peak hour flights.
F. PERMIT FOREIGN AIRLINES OR THEIR U.S. SUBSIDIARIES TO
OPERATE ON U.S. DOMESTIC ROUTES.
G. PROHIBIT EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CRS
OWNERS AND AIRLINES.
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The above proposals seek to indirectly influence the
market participants in a manner which, hopefully, would
induce them to adhere to a standard of conduct considered
to be desirable on the basis of an objective and rigorous
study of the industry. Obviously, these proposals are only
nebulous and before any concrete regulatory steps are
taken they would have to be studied in depth. However, it
hoped that they will provide some guidance to lawyers and
law makers in the matter of designing methods which will
try to cure the imperfections and limitations of the
market without taking away the individual choice of its
participants.
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